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Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency
After Twenty-five Years
Michael Stokes Paulsent
United States v. Nixon' was, and remains today, a case of
enormous doctrinal and political significance-easily one of the
five most important Supreme Court decisions of the last fifty
years. The decision proximately led to the forced resignation of
a President of the United States from office. The decision
helped spawn a semi-permanent statutory regime of Independent Counsel, exercising the prosecutorial power of the United
States and investigating executive branch officials 2-- a regime
that has fundamentally reshaped our national politics. Nixon
provided not only the political context that spawned the Independent Counsel statute, but a key step in the doctrinal evolution that led the Court to uphold its constitutionality, incorrectly, fourteen years later, in Morrison v. Olson.3
United States v. Nixon also established the principle that
the President possesses no constitutional immunity from compulsory legal process, a holding that led almost inexorably to
the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of presidential immunity from civil litigation for non-official conduct, twentythree years later, in Clinton v. Jones4 -a holding that helped
set in motion a series of events that led to the (self-inflicted)
crippling of another presidency. 5 In addition, by specifically
t Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law
School. I would like to thank Jill Radloff for invaluable research assistance
and comments on an earlier draft, the other participants in this conference for
their comments and critiques, and the staff of the Minnesota Law Review for
producing and publishing such an excellent symposium and inviting me to
participate in it.
1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994).
3. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
4. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
5. The Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones obviously did not
cause President Clinton's apparent perjury and obstruction of justice. These
acts, and their discovery, led to the year-long investigation, impeachment, and
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rejecting executive privilege in the context of an Independent
Counsel subpoena in a criminal proceeding, Nixon led unavoidably to judicial rejection of President Clinton's assertions
7
of executive privilege, 6 governmental attorney-client privilege,
8
and Secret Service "protective functions" privilege twenty-four
years later-judicial decisions that prevented President
Clinton from successfully covering up his own (likely) criminal
conduct, just as the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon prevented President Nixon from hiding his crimes behind claims
of the institutional prerogatives of the Presidency. 9
trial in the Senate. Bill Clinton's acts in response to the Supreme Court's
Jones decision were done of his own volition. Even on the assumption that
Jones was wrongly decided, the subsequent damage to the Clinton presidency
was done by Clinton, not by the Court.
6. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998)
(President Clinton initially appealed the adverse ruling on his executive
privilege claims, but then abandoned the claims when Independent Counsel
Starr sought certiorari before judgment in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Peter
Baker, Clinton May Drop Appeal on Privilege;Strategy Could Avert Supreme
Court Review, WASH. POST, June 1, 1998, at Al; Clinton to Limit Legal Appeal; Executive Privilege Claim to Be Dropped, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1998, at 1.
7. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997). See generally Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?, 83
MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998) (discussing issues presented by claim of attorneyclient privilege by government attorneys as against Independent Counsel
grand jury subpoenas).
8. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh'g denied,
146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998), stay denied, Office of the President v. Office of
the Independent Counsel, App. No. 1-108, 1998 WL 438524, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 4,
1998), and cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
9. Unlike President Nixon, however, President Clinton may nonetheless
escape the full political consequences of his actions. In February 1999, the
Senate declined to convict President Clinton by the constitutionally required
two-thirds majority of the articles of impeachment brought by the House of
Representatives, even though it appears that a substantial majority of senators agreed that Clinton in fact engaged in the conduct of which he was accused and for which he was impeached. A sufficiently large number of members of the Senate, comprised chiefly of members of Clinton's political party,
took the position that the conduct in question, even if criminal, did not rise to
the level of seriousness justifying conviction and removal from office of a
President who retained substantial popular political support. See Trial of the
President;Excerpts of Debate Comments; SenatorsSpell out Their Convictions,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A27 (excerpting debate testimony from Senators
who voted to acquit because in their view the conduct did not rise to the level
of constitutional high crimes); The Senate Verdict; Excerpts of Vote Comments;
Respect for Law, Defense of Presidency Cited As Impetus for Votes, L.A. TIMEs,
Feb. 13, 1999, at A22 (citing statements from Senators voting to acquit who
explained that their decision was in large part because the American people
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Finally, and perhaps most significantly of all, United
States v. Nixon explicitly and unequivocally asserted the principle-arguably for the first time-of absolute judicial supremacy over the President in matters of constitutional law involving the scope of the President's powers and prerogatives.10
This was a holding of immense consequence, then and now,
and was a necessary step in all of the Court's other holdings in
the Nixon Tapes Case.
continue to support President Clinton). President Nixon, by the time of his
resignation, had lost the political support of the public and of substantial
numbers of senators and representatives of his own political party.
President Clinton has not completely escaped legal jeopardy and punishment, however. As this article goes to press, the federal district judge in the
Jones litigation has held Clinton in contempt for "intentionally false" testimony before the court in Clinton's deposition. Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94290, 1999 WL 202909, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 12, 1999); see also id. at *7
("[Tihe record demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the President responded to plaintiffs questions by giving false, misleading, and evasive
answers that were designed to obstruct the judicial process."). Judge Wright
imposed monetary sanctions and also referred the matter to Arkansas Bar
disciplinary authorities. Id. at *10-12. In addition, President Clinton could
face criminal prosecution after leaving office, and quite possibly even before
leaving office. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
10. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704-05. The strongest competitor for this
honor is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in
which the Court declared unlawful the actions of President Truman's Secretary of Labor (Sawyer), at Truman's direction, in seizing the nation's steel
mills to avoid a strike. Though nominally directed to a cabinet officer, and not
the President, Youngstown Sheet & Tube is the most prominent pure case of a
judicial injunction directed at the executive, sustained by the U.S. Supreme
Court, on an issue of constitutional law concerning the scope of the President's
powers and prerogatives. The Court's opinion did not, as subsequently has
become fashionable, directly assert judicial supremacy over a coordinate
branch, but the Court did uphold the issuance of an injunction against an executive officer carrying out a presidential directive. The Court did not, except
by implication, assert an executive duty to obey-though the implication is a
very strong one.
A standard example often cited for the proposition of judicial supremacy
over the executive, and on which the Court relied in Nixon, is Marbury v.
Madison. Marbury, however does not assert judicial supremacy over the
President. Indeed, quite the contrary, Marbury explicitly denies any such
claim to supremacy. The Court did not order the Jefferson administration to
deliver to Mr. Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace, and Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion expressly denied any judicial power to "intermeddl[el with a subject over which the executive can be considered as having
exercised any control." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). Moreover, the reasoning supporting the Court's conclusion that the judiciary may not give effect
to unconstitutional acts of Congress decisively refutes any proposition that
one branch is supreme over the others in matters of constitutional interpretation. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 241-45, 257-62 (1994).
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Great cases make bad law, the maxim goes, and United
States v. Nixon was unquestionably a great case. It is also
something of a doctrinal train wreck. Each of its three major
holdings-(1) the supremacy of the judiciary over the executive
on constitutional issues of presidential power;1 (2) the creation
of an ad hoc judicial "balancing" test for the scope of constitutional executive privilege;12 and (3) the implied holding of lack
of presidential supremacy even within the executive branch
(that is, presidential supremacy over the actions of subordinate
executive officers) 3-is, if not flatly wrong, at least very seriously flawed. Moreover, each of those holdings has had very
serious repercussions for our constitutional system over the
last quarter century.
In this essay, I discuss Nixon's three main holdings. Section I addresses the issue of judicial versus presidential supremacy on executive privilege questions and argues that neither the position advanced by President Nixon's lawyers
(executive supremacy) nor that decided on by the Supreme
Court (judicial supremacy) is constitutionally sound. Contrary
to President Nixon's assertion, the scope of executive privilege
is not subject to the President's sole determination, with the
courts reduced to the role of ciphers, bound to honor and ratify
the President's determination.
Contrary to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Nixon, the judiciary is not supreme over the
President either. My proposition is as follows: as a matter of
fundamental constitutional structure-the cornerstone constitutional principle of separation of powers and the autonomy of
each branch within its sphere of operation-neither branch
may bind the other with, or demand acceptance from the other
of its assertions concerning the scope of their respective constitutionalpowers. It follows that the judiciary may not issue orders directed to the President concerning the scope of the
President's constitutional powers and prerogatives-at least
not orders that the President is constitutionally obliged to
obey. Nixon, in its assertion ofjudicial supremacy over the executive, is fundamentally wrong. The President, qua President, is not constitutionally subject to compulsory judicial process and orders at the judiciary's sole and exclusive judgment.

1L
12.
13.

See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703-05.
See id. at 707-14.
See id. at 694-97.
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Section 11 addresses the question of the proper scope of
"executive privilege"-the specific merits holding of Nixon. My
thesis on this point is that executive privilege is a sound inference from constitutional structure but that the text of the Constitution supplies no rule, enforceable by courts, concerning its
proper scope. Consequently, its scope is left, as with so many
other matters, to the interaction and competition of the three
branches of government. It is not left to an ad hoc judiciallycreated constitutional balancing test exclusively the province of
the courts, as Nixon held, and certainly not to the poorlydesigned balance the Court constructed in Nixon. The Constitution simply does not authorize creation of a mushy judicial
balancing test for determining the scope of constitutionallybased executive privilege.
The courts may, however, recognize common law privileges
(if so authorized by Congress, and subject to change by Congress). But even as a matter ofjudicial development of a common law executive privilege based on constitutional policy,
Nixon's rule for the scope and applicability of that privilege is
clumsy and unsound, being both too broad and too narrow. It
is too broad in giving the President apparently absolute and
unreviewable discretion to invoke "national security" to bar
any further judicial inquiry. 14 And it is too narrow in providing
insufficient protection for the confidentiality of executive
branch deliberations: Nixon provides less protection to the confidentiality of executive deliberations on high matters of government than is provided to communications between a lawyer
and client for purposes of drafting a simple will. Surely the
former communications should be as privileged as the latter.
The judicial rule should be that the President possesses a
nearly absolute evidentiary privilege, parallel to the common
law attorney-client privilege, to refuse to divulge and to direct
other executive branch officials not to divulge, confidential
communications between himself and his advisors, or among
14 Cf id- at 706 ("Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic,
or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for
in camera inspection...."). As Professor William Van Alstyne has argued,
the implication of this passage is that in the presence of a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the judicial
rule is that the executive's determination must be accepted in the courts. See
William Van Alstyne, A Politicaland ConstitutionalReview of United States
v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 123 (1974).
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his advisors, made for the legitimate lawful purposes of deliberation concerning matters relevant to lawful executive branch
policy and action involving any subject within the range of the
President's sphere of action under Article II, but subject to defeasance upon a sufficient showing that the communications
were made for purposes of furthering a crime or fraud. 15
Section III addresses the question of presidential supremacy within the executive branch and argues, again contra
United States v. Nixon, that the President of the United States
must have the final say as to all matters concerning the execution of the laws of the United States by officers of the executive
branch. He cannot constitutionally be required to accede to the
decisions of a designated subordinate, even if the President has
designated the subordinate and assigned him or her the power
in question. Nixon left the President an escape hatch-rescind
the regulation delegating power to the Special Prosecutorwhich might, barely, make the Court's decision constitutionally
16
tolerable as a matter of Article II constitutional structure.
Under Nixon, the President may countermand the Special
Prosecutor's executive actions, but only by firing him.17 President Nixon was simply required to bear the (unbearable) full
political cost of exercising his constitutional authority to countermand a subordinate executive branch officer. Morrison v.
Olson and the Independent Counsel statute, however-"Son of
Nixon" on this point-are constitutionally intolerable: the
President may countermand the executive decisions of an Independent Counsel only by firing him, and legal limitationsenforceable by courts against the President's will-exist on the

15. See infra text accompanying notes 128-137. Congress possesses
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to prescribe a statutory rule of
executive privilege in order to help the President carry into execution his
powers, as Professor Prakash's outstanding contribution to this symposium
sets forth at length. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on
the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143 (1999).
Congress has authorized the Courts to recognize common law privileges. See
FED. R. EVID. 501. Congress may create, or revise, a common law privilege,
modifying whatever (nonconstitutional) judicial rule the courts create on the

subject.
16. For a perceptive argument that, if this is the case, then an intraexecutive suit to compel presidential compliance with a subordinate's subpoena violates Article IH, see Professor Kelley's contribution to this symposium. William K Kelley, The ConstitutionalDilemma of Litigation Under the
Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1197 (1999).
17. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 696.
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power to fire. 18 Such limitations render the Independent
Counsel relationship unconstitutional.19
United States v. Nixon is, of course, inconsistent with each
of my three major propositions of constitutional law. Yet,
oddly, in spite of what I believe are its huge defects of reasoning and constitutional principle, United States v. Nixon was
rightly decided, in the narrow sense that its outcome is correct
and remains defensible even if each of my criticisms is right.
Indeed, looking back twenty-five years later, the result in
Nixon seems unavoidable. The Court pretty much had to rule
as it did. It is almost unimaginable that the case could have
come out any other way, because-to put it bluntly-Richard
Nixon was a crook. In the end, it would have been unthinkable
for the Supreme Court, with evidence before it of Nixon's likely
connection with a criminal conspiracy, to have honored Nixon's
claim of presidential immunity from judicial process or absolute executive privilege to refuse to produce the tapes in response to the Special Prosecutor's subpoena. But that should
have been the rationale of the decision: as far as the courts are
concerned, a claim of executive privilege must yield in the face
of evidence showing that the communications were in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and not for lawful purposes of
carrying out the President's constitutional duties. The Court
had difficulty translating this sound intuition into sound constitutional doctrine, and it did not succeed.
The Nixon case, I submit, thus suggests a corollary to the
maxim that great cases make bad law: bad Presidents make
bad law. By "bad" Presidents I mean here Presidents who corruptly abuse the Office of the Presidency to engage in, or to
hide, the criminal activity of themselves or others. (Presidents
might be "bad" in other respects as well, of course.) By "bad
law" I mean here constitutional decisions of the courts harmful
to the institution of the Presidency and destructive of its
proper constitutional powers. President Nixon was a bad
President-Richard Nixon was a crook-and it is therefore not
surprising that United States v. Nixon is bad law.
18. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1994).
19. My constitutional argument is in no way intended as an attack on Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr. Indeed, Starr's willingness to persist in
his assigned legal task, despite great opposition by the President, the President's agents, the press, and the public, shows the importance of the value of
independence in an "Independent Counsel." See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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The corollary, as with the Nixon Tapes Case itself, has direct application today, twenty-five years later. President
Clinton is a bad President-Bill Clinton is a crook. Indeed,
Clinton is a rather extraordinary white-collar criminal, skilled
in the arts of deception, lying and intimidation-and in legal
and political defense of the same-in ways that make Richard
Nixon look like a bungling amateur. Yet, for all his political
skills, the judicial landscape is littered with the products of
Clinton's unsuccessful and destructive attempts corruptly to
employ claims of privilege in order to conceal personal wrongdoing. The results in Clinton v. Jones, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, In re Lindsey, United States v. Clinton,
and In re Sealed Case,2O each rejecting a claimed privilege or
immunity of the President from compliance with compulsory
judicial process, all follow more or less directly from Nixon, but
each of these decisions has also further contributed to a weakened institutional Presidency. So too has Clinton's acquiescence in the power of a criminal grand jury to compel the "voluntary" testimony of a sitting President weakened the office. 2 1
That weakening, in all of the above respects, is attributable to
President Clinton's misconduct and his attempts to enlist the
judiciary in support of his resistance to the discovery of evidence showing such misconduct.
President Clinton has left his stain on the Presidency.
Like President Nixon twenty-five years ago, he has weakened
the Office. He has weakened its powers and prerogatives by
abusing them for his personal purposes. Clinton is the first
elected President to be impeached. The political loyalty of the
senators of his own party, combined with the state of the economy and plausible arguments that the criminal conduct in
question involved little or no misuse of presidential power,
spared him removal from office. 22 Even in technical acquittal,
though, Clinton has weakened the moral and political prestige
of the Presidency: the argument that won the day-that prevented a two-thirds majority for conviction-was some variant
or another of the proposition that it is (sometimes) permissible
20. See supra notes 4, 6-8 and accompanying text.
21. See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, ClintonAgrees to Testify for Grand
Jury; Sources Say Lewinski Has Physical Evidence, WASH. POST, July 30,
1998, at Al.
22. See 145 CONG. REC. S1458-59 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (recording a 4555 vote to convict on the perjury article of impeachment and a 50-50 vote to
convict on the obstruction ofjustice article of impeachment).
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for the President of the United States to be a felon and remain
in office; i.e., that criminal acts are not sufficient to warrant
impeachment and removal and that actual criminal prosecution of the President, after he leaves office, is sufficient to protect the character and integrity of the Office of the Presidency.
All of which leads to two critical questions, which I address
in Section IV: Can the full constitutional power and constitutional prestige of the Presidency be reasserted and recovered?
And more importantly, can this be accomplished in such a way
as not to enable future corrupt Presidents to escape accountability for wrongdoing? The answer to the first question is
Yes-the constitutional prerogatives of the Presidency can and
should be restored, notwithstanding Nixon (and notwithstanding Clinton), by a strong President or succession of Presidents committed to the constitutional defense and rehabilitation of the Office, under circumstances in which such defense is
principled and not for purposes of hiding personal wrongdoing.
The answer to the second question is Maybe. The Presidency
can be strong yet effectively checked-indeed, this was the
framer's original vision. But this depends on whether Congress's impeachment power is also reasserted and recovered, a
question which has been put to the test in circumstances as
important to the future of our constitutional system as they
were twenty-five years ago, and answered in the negative,
largely along party lines. History may well choose not to treat
the Clinton acquittal as an admirable precedent. For now,
however, it may signal the inability of our constitutional system to check a determined and politically savvy President who
holds himself above the law, leaving the prospect of a reinvigorated Presidency something perhaps to be feared rather than
cheered.
I. NIXON AND THE DEATH OF PRESIDENTIAL
INTERPRETIVE AUTONOMY
By far the most important holding ofNixon is the Supreme
Court's rejection of Nixon's claim that his invocation of executive privilege is unreviewable by the judiciary and the Court's
assertion that, quite the reverse, resolution of questions of executive privilege lies within the exclusive, unreviewable power
of the courts.23 The power of the judiciary "to say what the law

23. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974).
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the Court said, augustly quoting Marbury v. Madison as if
it supported this proposition, "can no more be shared with the
Executive Branch than the Chief Executive... can share with
the Judiciary the veto power."25 Put less grandiloquently, the
interpretation of the President's constitutional powers is the
exclusive province of a supreme judiciary-according to the judiciary.
This was far more than a statement that the President
was not the exclusive judge of the scope of executive privilege,
for other branches as well as for himself, as Nixon's lawyers
had argued. (That was an absurdly foolish argument to press
to a court, as I will discuss presently).2 6 Rejection of Nixon's
extreme argument that the judiciary must recognize in the
President an absolute prerogative to invoke executive privilege
and refuse to comply with a judicial subpoena was all that the
Court needed to say in order to rule against President Nixon in
the Tapes Case. The Court went further, though. It asserted
not only that the President is not the sole arbiter of the scope of
executive privilege but that the judiciary is the exclusive judge
of the scope of executive privilege. 27 (The Court did this even
though it had just given lip service, the page before, to the responsibility of the other branches "initially" to interpret the
Constitution in the course of exercising their powers. 28)
By 1999, we have become habituated (and thus desensitized) to the Court's assertion of judicial supremacy over the
other branches of government. In 1974, this was still a fairly
extraordinary assertion of judicial power. It is not clear that
the Supreme Court had ever before genuinely asserted such a
power. 29 Cooper v. Aaron's assertion of judicial supremacy
(1958) was directed at the power of states, and can be read as
an assertion of federal supremacy, not judicial supremacy.30
Cooper did not command the President to take action the
is,"24

24. Id. at 703, 705 (quoting Marbwy).
25. Id. at 704.
26. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
27. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
28. Id. at 703.
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
30. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that Marbury established the proposition "that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution"). See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 314-15 ("Whatever the weight
of the[ I arguments against Calhoun-style nullification, they do not add up to
a justification of federal judicial supremacy over the other branches of the
federal government.").
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President disagreed with on constitutional grounds. The
Eisenhower administration had argued for the result in
Brown,31 and President Eisenhower had sent the troops to Little Rock a year before the Supreme Court's opinion. Baker v.
Carr (1962) repeated Cooper's dictum, in another case involv32
ing an assertion of federal judicial power over the states.
Powell v. McCormack (1969) with great care refrained from asit granted a declaraserting judicial supremacy over Congress;
33
tory judgment but no coercive relief.
The circumstances of 1974 were different. In United
States v. Nixon, the Court probably felt it had to make a bold,
Cooper-esque unanimous assertion of its constitutional
authority over the President, if its judgment that Nixon must
turn over the tapes was to be honored. Nixon was similar to
Cooper in that the Court probably felt it necessary in each instance to bring the full prestige of the judiciary to bear behind
its judgment and opinion in order to assure that the Court's
decision would be obeyed and enforced. (After all, what court
Lose such a politicalwants its judgments flouted?
constitutional battle just once, in a case that matters, and the
observations
courts are in danger of confirming Hamilton's
34
about "the natural feebleness of the judiciary." )
It is hard for us, twenty-five years later, to appreciate fully
the very real anxiety at the time that President Nixon might
refuse to abide by the Court's judgment. Nixon's lawyers had
argued in their brief to the Court-in block capital-lettered
point headings that left little room for misunderstanding-that

31. Brownv. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. 395 U.S. 486, 501-06, 517-18 (1969) (relief against House employees,
but not against Members or House itself, was appropriate; declaratory relief
was permissible regardless of the appropriateness of a coercive remedy). As
noted above, see supra note 10, the only true precedent supporting the Court's
sweeping statement in Nixon is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), in which the Court held that President Truman's labor secretary lacked power to seize the nation's steel mills. But in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube the Court did not issue an order directly to the President and did not
issue a Cooper-like assertion of judicial supremacy over the President. See id.
It simply declared its understanding of what the law was. The President
obeyed, but the Court had not explicitly decreed that the President was constitutionally obliged to obey its decision. That rhetorical gambit did not appear in the Court's standard arsenal until six years later, in 1958, with Cooper.
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982).
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"A PRESIDENTIAL ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE IS NOT
REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT."
And, further: "THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE PRECLUDES JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE USE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
BY A PRESIDENT.35
The point was not lost on the justices. At oral argument,
the President's lawyer, James St. Clair, was quizzed on
whether the President would abide by the judgment of the
Court:
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: The difference between ignoring [a
subpoena duces tecum] and filing a motion to quash is what?
MR. ST. CLAIR [counsel for Nixon]: Well, if Your Honor please,
we are submitting the matterMR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: You are submitting the matter to
this CourtMR. ST. CLAIR: To this Court under a special showing on behalf
of the PresidentMR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: And you are still leaving it up to this
Court to decide it.
MR. ST. CLAIR: Yes, in a sense.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: In what sense?
MR. ST. CLAIR: In the sense that this Court has the obligation to
determine the law. The President also has an obligation to carry out
his constitutional duties.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: You are submitting it for us to decide
whether or not executive privilege is available in this case.
MR. ST. CLAIR: [Tihe problem is the question is even more limited than that. Is the executive privilege, which my brother concedes,
absolute or is it only conditional?
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: I said "in this case." Can you make
it any narrower than that?
MR. ST. CLAIR: No, sir.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Well, do you agree that that is what
is before this Court, and you are submitting it to this Court for decision?
MR. ST. CLAIR: This is being submitted to this Court for its
guidance and judgment with respect to the law. The President, on
the other hand, has his obligations under the Constitution.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: Are you submitting it to this Court
for this Court's decision?
MR. ST. CLAIR: As to what the law is, yes.

35. Respondent's Opening Brief at 48, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974) (No. 73-1766, 1834).
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER: If that were not so, you would
not be here.
36
MR. ST. CLAIR: I would not be here.

Clearly, Mr. St. Clair was attempting at least to leave open the
possibility that President Nixon might not obey the Court's decision rejecting executive privilege.
In this context, and given the fevers that raged in the capital over Nixon and Watergate, the Court's assertion of judicial
supremacy over the executive must be seen as an extraordinary response to an extraordinary constitutional provocation.
Richard Nixon had raised the stakes with his constitutional
bluff (if bluff it was) and the Court responded by raising them
yet further. The result was a sweeping assertion of judicial supremacy and a judicial holding that the Supreme Court may
issue binding orders to the President of the United States concerning the scope of his constitutional powers and duties:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others,
the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts
by Art. 11, §1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the
Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share
with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the
Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers
and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite
government. We therefore reafrm that it is the province and duty of
this Court "to say what the37 law is" with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.

This holding was inevitable, given Nixon's position. Yet,
this holding, to the extent it is meant to be an assertion ofjudicial supremacy, is dead wrong. The claim of judicial supremacy finds no support anywhere in the Constitution. No provision of the text confers supremacy on the judiciary. The courts
possess the "judicial power" to decide "cases" and "controversies," including cases arising under the Constitution, but
nothing in history, logic, or the intrinsic meaning of any of
these terms of Article HI implies judicial supremacy and none
of the Constitution's defenders and advocates ever suggested
as much. 38 No prominent framer, advocate, or defender of the
Constitution-indeed, no obscure one, as far as I know-at any
36. Oral Argument at 60-62, Nixon (No. 73-1766, 1834). I am indebted to
the outstanding article of Professor William Van Alstyne, twenty-five years
ago, for calling my attention to this passage in the oral argument. See Van
Alstyne, supra note 14, at 123.
37. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704-05 (citations omitted).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 294-300.
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time during the framing, ratification, or early implementation
of the Constitution ever embraced or endorsed the notion that
the Constitution provides for judicial supremacy over the other
branches in constitutional interpretation. Again, quite the opposite is true. All prominent public defenses of the Constitution at the time of its adoption are explicit in denying the notion of judicial supremacy. The only contrary statements
during the ratification era appear in writings of the Constitution's opponents.39 The first early-implementation era statements to the contrary appear a dozen years later, in the form of
northern state attacks on the legitimacy of the Virginia and
Kentucky resolves. 40 The first prominent scholarly assertion of
judicial supremacy over the other branches appears in Justice
Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States, in 1833.41 Its first appearance in an important opinion
by a Supreme Court Justice, in an actual case or controversy
presenting the issue, is not until Chief Justice Taney's opinion
39. See Essays of Brutus, No. XI, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI§§ 2.0.138.-2.9.148 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Brutus argued,
perhaps genuinely and perhaps with deliberate exaggeration, that the judiciary to be created by the new Constitution would be supreme over the elected
branches in matters of constitutional interpretation, and that such a prospect
would have the effect of concentrating power in that branch, at the expense of
republican principles, the rights of the states, and ultimately individual liberty. It is interesting and instructive that The FederalistNo. 78 is a rejoinder
to the Essays of Brutus on the judicial power, explaining judicial review as an
unexceptional and logical consequence of the coordinacy of the branches, least
of all to be feared from the "least dangerous" and weakest of branches, which
needed life tenure in order to protect its independent judgments and would in
any event be dependent on the executive branch for enforcement of its judgments. See infra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Paulsen, supra note
10, at 245-52.
40. The first serious post-enactment arguments in favor of judicial supremacy were advanced by northern state legislatures responding to the VirFEDERALIST

ginia and Kentucky resolves in the late 1790s-more than a decade after the
Philadelphia convention-and took place in the context of a bitter political
fight between defenders and opponents of the Adams administration over the
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition acts. See, e.g., 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT

PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1891) To the extent this post-enactment "legislative history" is of any weight at all in determining the original meaning of the Constitution on the question of judicial supremacy, it is surely significant that the election of 1800 appeared decisively
to repudiate the "Federalist" (that is, pro-Adams), judicial supremacist view.
41.

1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES § 375 (1833). For discussion of Story's views as a secondgeneration theory that strayed from the original understanding of judicial review, see Paulsen, supra note 10, at 311-20.
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(as circuit justice) in Ex Parte Merryman, in 1861.42 Judicial
supremacy is simply not an originalist position. It is consistent
with none of the evidence we have of the original meaning of
the Constitution.
Nor is judicial supremacy fairly deducible from the constitutional structure of separation of powers (as the Nixon Court
suggested, with its citation to The FederalistNo. 47).43 Quite
the reverse, judicial supremacy is irreconcilable with the structural postulates of the Constitution: separation of powers and
the coordinacy and autonomy of the three branches. The fundamental premise of the Constitution's separation of powers
into three great Departments is that they are all independent
of and co-equal with each other." None has a superordinate
power over any of the others-that is, a peremptory constitutional power to tell another branch what it must do or must not
do. The intersection and interaction of the three Departments'
respective powers provides the means for mutual checking of
one another; but they are checks only, not trumps. The Constitution gives no branch, including the judiciary, an ultimate
trump power over the others.
The framers could scarcely have been more clear on this
score. The most succinct expression of their view comes in The
FederalistNo. 49's discussion of separation of powers: "The
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of
their common commission, neither of them, it is evident, can
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers."45 That is a
sweeping, categorical rejection of one-branch interpretive supremacy. It necessarily includes a rejection of the idea of judicial supremacy over the other branches (a position reinforced
by The FederalistNo. 78's discussion of judicial review, as we
46
shall see in a moment).

42. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). See generally Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive BranchInterpretation,15 CAROZO L. REV. 81 (1993).

43. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
44. The arguments made in this paragraph of the text, and in those that
follow, are developed at great length in Paulsen, supra note 10. I present here
a greatly compressed account of the evidence.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 255 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,
1982).
46. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 34, at 394; see also infra
notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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How, then, to check government power and keep each
branch within its sphere? What is the method (if it is not judicial supremacy) "for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in
the Constitution?47 The answer, according to The Federalist,
lies neither in making one branch superior to the others nor in
holding regular or periodic constitutional conventions (possibilities discussed but rejected in No. 49).48 Rather, "the defect
must be supplied by so contriving the interior structure of the
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their
mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places."49 Thus, "each department should have a will of
its own" and be as independent of the others as possible, in the
means by which their members are selected, in the security of
their members' salaries, in their ability to carry out their constitutional powers (subject to the checks of other branches),
and in their ability to resist the attempted or pretended aggressions of the others, either singly or in combination.50 In
Madison's famous words as Publius,
the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others .... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.I

Thus, the structure of the Constitution-separation of powers-would, by spurring "opposite and rival interests" supply
"the defect of better motives."52
Where is judicial supremacy in this discussion? It is nowhere to be found. Where is the suggestion, even the discussion as a mere possibility, that disputes among the branches
are to be resolved by the courts as arbiters of constitutional
meaning, as part of the judicial power? Such an option is not
even on the menu. Constitutional conventions are given serious discussion as a possibility for resolving constitutional disputes, but judicial supremacy is not.

47. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 261 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,
1982).
48. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 45, at 255.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 47, at 261.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id. at 263.

UNITED STATES V. NIXON

1999]

1353

Further confirmation of this comes from a seemingly unlikely but extremely important source: Alexander Hamilton's
argument for judicial review in The FederalistNo. 78.53 Hamilton, fully in accord with Madison, his co-author as Publius,
takes pains to deny the legitimacy of any inference of judicial
hegemony.5 4 Indeed, the paper is a more or less direct rebuttal
of the anti-Federalist writer "Brutus," who had charged that
"Itihe opinions of the supreme court... will have the force of
law" and that "because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications" the courts would acquire a practical omnipotence over
the other branches, resulting in "an entire subversion of the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual
states."55
This was a charge that mattered to the founding generation-judicial supremacy equaled rule by an elite, appointive
oligarchy with life tenure and subject to no republican check, a
killer argument against ratification, if valid.5 6 Refutation of
Brutus is the object of The FederalistNo. 78, which in form is
simply an extended defense of the idea of life tenure for federal
judges. Recent scholarship has shown that Hamilton's argument for judicial review was not itself original or especially
controversial. 57 The discussion of judicial review is, within the
structure of Hamilton's argument for life tenure, almost incidental; it serves to illustrate the value of life tenure for protecting the necessary independence of an intrinsically weak judiciary. Since the judiciary "is beyond comparison the weakest
of the three departments of power" and "can never attack with
success either of the other two," it is necessary to provide life
tenure to enable the judiciary "to defend itself' against attempts by the political branches to coerce or overawe.5 8 Such
independence is "peculiarly essential in a limited constitution"
where certain powers are granted and certain acts forbidden,
53.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 34, at 394.

54. See id.
55. Essays of Brutus, No. XI, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 39, §§ 2.9.138, 2.9.139; see also JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL

MEANINGS:

POLITICS

AND

IDEAS

IN THE

MAKING OF

THE

CONSTITUTION 186-87 (1997); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE
FEDERALIST 126-36 (1981).
56. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 246.
57. For an excellent study, see SYLIVA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990).
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 34, at 394.
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Hamilton adds, making the transition to his discussion of judi59
cial review.
Hamilton then turns to Brutus's argument (without identifying his opponent by name):
Some perplexity respecting the right of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the constitution, has arisen
from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of
the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority
which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. 0

Not so, Hamilton maintained. The inference of judicial review
does not "suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is supe6
rior to both." 1
Hamilton's discussion fits perfectly with Madison's description of separation of powers in Numbers 47 to 51. Hamilton's justification of judicial review is premised on the same
theory of coordinacy of the branches. The Constitution trumps
acts of mere government agents. Thus, where the two conflict,
a court must follow the Constitution rather than an Act of
Congress. The judgment of Congress as to the constitutionality
of its own acts cannot be conclusive on the courts, because of
the independence and coordinacy of the branches: the members
of one branch are not "themselves the constitutional judges of
their own powers" and it thus cannot be presumed that "the
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other
departments."62 Each branch's obligation is to obey the Constitution, not each other.
The logic of Hamilton's argument-and, later, of John
Marshall's in Marbury v. Madison 63-suggests the very antithesis of judicial supremacy: the executive and Congress are
not strictly bound by the Court's views either. The essence of
the argument for judicial review is that the Constitution must
be preferred to the contrary acts of a mere department, and
that one department cannot be bound by the views of another
concerning the propriety of that other branch's own acts. The
logic of the argument does'not vary depending on which

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
68-72.

Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
I will address Marbury presently. See infra text accompanying notes
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branch's act is being judged and which branch is passing
judgment (Congress, Court, or Executive).6 4
Hamilton did not explicitly draw this further conclusion,
but at almost every turn, The FederalistNo. 78, in its repeated
emphasis of the weakness of the courts vis-h-vis the political
branches, is completely inconsistent with the contrary notion of
judicial supremacy. Hamilton's observation that the judiciary
"can never attack with success" either of the other two
branches (and indeed is barely able to defend itself) is not consistent with modem notions of judicial supremacy. 65 Rather,
the power of judicial review is a function of having a limited
constitution and the autonomy of the three branches within
their sphere of operation. There is nothing exceptional about
constitutional review by one branch of the acts of another, and
nothing to be feared about such a consequence, least of all in a
judiciary that possesses "neither Force nor Will, but merely
judgment" and, Hamilton adds in an important clincher, that
"must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
66
even for the efficacy of its judgments."
64. The general point is most succinctly expressed by James Wilson,
probably the second most influential framer at the convention (after Madison),
in his famous Lectures on Law (1790-1792): "The supreme power of the United
States has given one rule: a subordinate power in the United States has given
a contradictory rule: the former is the law of the land: as a necessary consequence, the latter is void, and has no operation." 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 330 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 34, at 394.
66. Id. Professor Steve Calabresi, in his insightful Comment on this paper for this symposium, is unwilling to accept the proposition that the President's coordinate power of constitutional interpretation includes a right to decline to enforce judicial judgments that the President concludes, in good faith,
are founded on an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution or other law.
See Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism,Departmentalism,and ProfessorPaulsen,

83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (1999). (In the end, however, Calabresi comes
close to conceding exactly this proposition, although wishing, sensibly enough,
to confine its application to extreme or at least very clear cases of judicial error, see id. at 1425, 1433 & n.54, a concession which in principle gives up the
game, as I will discuss momentarily.)
Professor Calabresi offers essentially three arguments for judicial supremacy as to judgments. All of them strike me as flawed in important respects. First, Calabresi argues that the traditional bar on the judiciary's issuance of "advisory opinions" implies a more general principle that "there must
be a substantial likelihood that judicial opinions will have some real world effect," id. at 1426, and that "[n]o such likelihood could exist if... the President
ha[d] the power independently to make his own de novo decision about
whether any judicial judgment was constitutional or not before he executed
it." Id. I think this overreads, and overextends, the "no advisory opinion"
doctrine. That doctrine is properly understood as a prohibition on courts is-
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suing legal opinions while not engaged in the judicial task of deciding actual
"cases or controversies." As I have set forth at greater length elsewhere, however, the fact that a judicial decree does not control the Article HI executive in
the exercise of his independent constitutional interpretation does not mean
that such a decree is not a proper exercise of courts' Article III powers. The
opinion is not "advisory" in the sense in which advisory opinions are thought
improper, i.e., that they do not involve the genuine application of the Article
III power of rendering a judgment in a case or controversy. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 303-06 (discussing Hayburn'sCase).
Second, Calabresi remarks (almost in passing) that everybody has always understood the judicial power as being a power to issue binding judgments. See Calabresi, supra, at 1426. This point is not proved by any stretch
of the imagination. To be sure, such a position is widely assumed today, but
the historical evidence for it is remarkably weak; and Hamilton's statement in
The FederalistNo. 78 that the judiciary must depend on the executive for the
efficacy of its judgments seems a powerful refutation of this assumption. See
Paulsen, supra note 10, at 251. Calabresi's only refutation of The Federalist
No. 78 on this point is to disparage it as "Alexander Hamilton's loose language"! This is a rather surprising position for Calabresi, a noted originalist,
to take, especially when he is arguing about historical understanding of the
meaning of the judicial power. I'll take Hamilton and The FederalistNo. 78
over assumptions from silence any day, especially when the logic of Hamilton's argument for judicial review (and that of James Wilson and John Marshall, and numerous others) implies a fully coordinate power of executive review, with all that that implies. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 244-55.
Third, Calabresi argues that fully coordinate, co-equal executive review
would leave the courts "ciphers," see Calabresi, supra, at 1432 ("federal courts
without the power to execute their judgments would be ciphers"), and make
Presidents "democratic Caesars," id., or, switching dictators, "Napoleonic
strongm[eln," id. at 1431. But the fact that an executive power not to enforce
judgments that the President believes are founded on unconstitutional usurpations or constructions of power by the judiciary might weaken the present
political power of courts, or be a fearsome power to vest in an evil and willful
chief executive, does not mean the proposition is wrong as an original matter.
The potential abuse of a power does not disprove the existence of such a
power. In addition, there is much historical evidence that the framers regarded the judiciary as "least dangerous" because it had the least power and
thus the least ability to force its constitutional pretensions on the other
branches. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 300-03. (Professor Lawson and Mr.
Moore make the same argument as Professor Calabresi, see Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation,
81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1325 (1996), which can be met with the same rejoinder.) To be sure, executive review, unchecked by the other branches, or divorced from a practice of "executive restraint" and a restrained, originalist
interpretive method, would be a dangerous thing. But I have set forth these
checks and restraints at length. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 321-42. Use of
the name "Caesar" is not a sufficient rebuttal. Finally, while it is true that,
under this theory, a new President can change executive branch constitutional
interpretations suddenly and radically and thereby alter the constitutional
equilibrium, the same can be said of changes in the composition of the courts.
Again, this objection at most furnishes an argument for a theory of "executive
restraint" and principled, text-based constitutional interpretation-a position
I have advanced in conjunction with the larger theory. See id. at 331-43.
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In short, The FederalistNo. 78 is scarcely a defense of judicial supremacy. 67 Neither is Marbury: nowhere does Chief
Justice Marshall ever assert a superordinate power of the judiciary to say what the law is; his entire argument is for a coordinate power with that of the other branches--one branch cannot be bound by the constitutional determinations of another.
Marbury essentially tracks the analysis (and sometimes even
the verbal formulations) of The FederalistNo. 78 in this respect. 68 The Court explicitly denies any power to "intermeddle
(Changes in administration can radically change other policies, too, and some
of those might be of much more consequence to the nation than differences
between subsequent administrations' positions on questions of constitutional
interpretation.)
In the end, however, Calabresi's (and Lawson & Moore's) concession that
the President rightfully possesses the power to refuse to enforce a clearly
wrong judgment of the courts gives up the point in principle. See Calabresi,
supra, at 1425, 1433 & n.54; Lawson & Moore, supra, at 1324-26. Calabresi
has to make this concession of course; otherwise, the courts would concededly
have the power to order anything they like, which eviscerates the departmentalist position to which Calabresi (rightly) clings in every other respect. See
Paulsen, supra note 42, at 83 (arguing that every attempted "middle ground"
position attempting to reconcile the premises of judicial supremacy or interpretive coordinacy ultimately collapses into one of the two polar cases). But
that gives up the "middle ground" game: as I challenged Professor Calabresi
during the question-and-answer session of our panel, is Roe v. Wade a case of
clear constitutional error? If yes, his position (and Professor Lawson's) collapses into mine. If no, then the notion of "clear error" has little content and
Calabresi's position collapses into complete judicial supremacy over the executive, (except, apparently, in time of Civil War). See Calabresi, supra, at 1427,
1430 & n.44. In the end, Professor Calabresi and I are just arguing about
which judicial decisions are "clearly" wrong, as opposed to "merely" wrong,
and engaged in interpersonal comparisons of what degree of certainty ought
to be required before acting on one's best judgment as to the meaning of the
Constitution. (Really, Steve, the only "clear error" by the courts, justifying
presidential noncompliance or nonenforcement, was Taney's decision in Ex
ParteMerryman? I can think of a good dozen more clearly and horribly wrong
judicial interpretations of the constitution-Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, Roe,
Casey-can't you?) To borrow a phrase, Calabresi has conceded the point in
principle. We are now just haggling over the price.
67. Hamilton's observation that the judiciary must depend on the executive for the efficacy of its judgments at least implies a power of "executive review"-a power of the President not to enforce judicial decrees he sincerely
believes are contrary to law and contrary to his duties under the law. Such a
conclusion is consistent with the rest of The FederalistNo. 78. If the President were constitutionally obliged to follow the commands of the courts,
Hamilton's argument that the liberty of the people can never be endangered
from the courts "so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislative and executive," THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 34, at 394, falls
apart, for the power of the judiciary then would be fused with the power to
execute the laws.
68. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 248.
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with the prerogatives of the executive," calling such a notion
"[an extravagance, so absurd and excessive" that it "could not
have been entertained for a moment. The province of the court
is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire
how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in
which they have a discretion."69
To rely, then, as the Court in Nixon did, on Marbury's
statement that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is,"70 wrenched from
its context, as if it supported a power of one-branch interpretive supremacy-and a power of the courts to give orders to the
President-is utterly remarkable. Taken seriously, such an
atextual, ahistorical assertion makes the judiciary the most
dangerous branch. If the Supreme Court is really the Supreme
Branch, there is no limit to what the Court may hold in the
name of the Constitution, other than the Court's selective forbearance, political caution, or moderate policy goals. The
courts may from time to time assert sundry doctrines of "judicial restraint" or exercise supposed "passive virtues," but that
is just modest exercise of an immodest assertion of power.7 1
The Constitution remains (or becomes) whatever the judges decree. Even if the courts go absolutely mad, it is still improper
for the political branches to resist them or rein them in, for it is
the province of the courts, and not Congress or the President,
to say what the law is. Defiance of the judicial branch is defiance of the ConstitutionY2
So saith the judicial branch. The judiciary's assertion of
hegemony does not make it so, of course. The Court's assertion
is almost laughably inconsistent with the tripartite structure of
69. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
70. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
71. See generally ROBERT H. BOR, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw (1990) (advancing a judicial philosophy of
originalism and judicial restraint as an essential limitation on the power of
courts that exercise supremacy in constitutional interpretation); ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1988) (defending the "passive virtues" of decisionavoidance and justiciability limitations on the Court's decisionmaking, as a
necessary method for the judiciary to conserve its political capital and avoid
getting out too far in front of the political branches). Both Bork and Bickel
are concerned with how judicial supremacy should be exercised, not with
whether judicial supremacy is the correct starting point. Both assume that it

is.
72. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 704 (stating that the judicial power to say what
the law is "can no more be shared" than the President's veto power).
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the federal government, with the Constitution's careful scheme
of calibration and separation of powers and checks-andbalances, and with every word the framers ever said on the
subject. Unfortunately, however, acceptance of the judiciary's
assertion of hegemony by the other branches tends to validate
such hegemony as a practical matter, and the Nixon caseboth the decision and even more so President Nixon's seeking

of it and compliance with it-has become a huge precedent for
executive acquiescence in judicial supremacy over the
executive as a constitutional norm. Nixon looms much larger
than Youngstown Sheet & Tube in this regard, for Nixon was a
judgment against the President personally (not a subordinate
officer), explicitly rejected the President's claim that the courts
had no authority to contest his claim of executive prerogative,
and essentially ordered coercive relief against a sitting President. The Court had called the President's bluff and asserted
its own primacy. And Nixon folded.
Such executive passivity makes a mockery of The Federalist No. 51's description of the Constitution's plan for preserving
separation of powers: "giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal
motives, to resist encroachments of the others" and thus "supplying by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives."73 Madison's plan doesn't work if the political branches
cede to the judiciary supremacy in defining the meaning and
application of the Constitution, including construction of the
powers and privileges of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches.
Passivity and quiescence would not seem to describe Richard Nixon. What more perfect example could there have been
(prior to Clinton) than President Nixon of "the interests of the
man" supplying "the defect of better motives" for asserting "the
constitutional rights of the place"?74 Yet Nixon accepted the
Court's assertion of supremacy and rejection of presidential
privilege, erasing in substantial part the successes of Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt in resisting
judicial authority. My contention, however, is that by the time
the case was decided by the Supreme Court, Nixon pretty much
had to give in, for two reasons.

73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 47, at 262-63.
74. Id.
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First, Nixon was too politically weakened and discredited
by the mounting evidence of his guilt to make a credible stand
on supposed constitutional principle against the unanimous
authority of the Supreme Court. In 1974, the existence of evidence that the President of the United States had apparently
committed obstruction of justice shocked and offended the
public and the political classes, and eventually overcame the
natural instinct to defend a popularly elected President. In
short, Nixon was a crook and the public was coming around,
finally, to accepting that uncomfortable truth. (Today, the reaction to evidence of similar types of action by the President
has been split, disturbingly, along largely partisan lines. Conservatives have been unwilling to distinguish between different
cases of lying and obstruction of justice; liberals have strained
to draw such lines.) Second, and somewhat relatedly, Nixon
had already gone, hat in hand, to the judiciary, asking for its
help in resisting the subpoena.7 5 He could not readily turn
around and spurn its adverse decision. Each of these reasons
has import of its own worth exploring.
By the time the Court rendered its decision on July 24,
1974, Nixon was decisively weakened in his ability to continue
to assert absolute privilege, in the teeth of the Court's decision,
by the increasingly evident illegitimacy of his personal motives. Nixon could not just order Jaworski to withdraw the
subpoena because he had bargained away his power to do so in
the face of widespread congressional and public suspicion that
his reason for firing Archibald Cox (the "Saturday Night Massacre") was simply that Cox was getting too close to the truth.
And the claim of plenary executive power to assert absolute executive privilege against a unanimous Supreme Court is just
too bold a claim to come out of the mouth of an unindicted coconspirator.
Is this too glib an observation? I don't think so. More to
the point, the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon didn't
seem to think so. There are several important clues in the
opinion that suggest that Richard Nixon's probable criminality
was relevant to the way it viewed and resolved the legal issues
before it. There is the fact that Nixon had been named an
"unindicted co-conspirator," a characterization that Nixon's
lawyers argued vigorously was beyond the province of the
grand jury and should be ignored by the Court, but which the
75.

See supra text accompanying note 36.
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Court not only left undisturbed, 6 but then seemed to rely on in
the course of determining that the evidence sought was relevant and presumptively admissible-thus satisfying the Rule
17(c) standard necessary to justify issuance of a subpoena in
the first place. 77 There are also the pregnantly ambiguous references to facts transmitted "under seal."73 There is the footnote, seemingly combining both the preceding points, noting
that the admissibility of out-of-court declarations of a coconspirator depends upon the existence of "substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the
question to the jury."79 And finally, there is the discussion, late
in the opinion, following the Court's rejection of the claim of
absolute presidential privilege, and explaining how such
privilege claims are to be considered by the district court:
Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the further duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed
material as presumptively privileged and to require the Special
Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was "essential to the justice of the [pending criminal] case." Here the District
Court treated the material as presumptively privileged, proceeded to
find that the Special Prosecutor had made a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption, and ordered an in camera examination of the
subpoenaed material. On the basis of our examination of the record
we are unable to conclude that the DistrictCourt erred in orderingthe
inspection.80

In light of what had gone before-the holding that Rule 17(c)
was satisfied upon a showing of, among other things, admissibility, which depended on independent substantial evidence of
the declarant's involvement in a conspiracy; the refusal to disturb the grand jury's naming of President Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator; the references to the Court's careful review of the sealed record-the holding that the district court
did not err in finding a presumptive privilege overcome by the

76. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687 & n.2. The Court dismissed as improvidently granted its writ of certiorari addressing this issue, on the ground that
"we find resolution of this issue unnecessary to resolution of the question
whether the claim of privilege is to prevail." Id. at 687 n.2.
77. Id. at 701 (explaining hearsay rule's exception for statements of coconspirators against each other, including "declarations of coconspirators who
are not defendants in the case on trial").
78. Id. at 689, 700.
79. Id. at 701 n.14.
80. Id. at 713-14 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. at 192).
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Special Prosecutor's showing that the evidence was "essential
to the justice of the case" screams out for more clear language:
The Presidentis a crook. We have read the record. There is substantial independent evidence of his involvement in a criminal conspiracy
involving obstruction ofjustice. Given this record, we have no trouble
holdingthat the claim of absolute executive privilege to shield the contents of conversations between co-conspirators,concerning matters not
claimed to involve national security, military, or diplomatic secrets,
should be rejected. Let the facts come out.

That is not, of course, what the Court said. But I believe it is
the practical import of its more deferential-sounding opinion.
(Courts, lawyers, journalists, Presidents, were all a little more
decorous in 1974 than in the late 1990s.) The substantive lesson is simply this: claims of grand constitutional principle, in
defense of the prerogatives of The Office and against an imperial judiciary, do not sit well when coming from dishonest
Presidents.
The second reason why Nixon could not readily resist the
Court's ruling was that he had sought the judiciary's endorsement of his assertion of supremacy. He had come to court with
a motion to quash the subpoena, seeking to enlist the courts'
assistance in his battle with the Special Prosecutor. Let's return to the first question posed by Justice Thurgood Marshall
in the oral argument exchange quoted at length earlier:
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL The difference between ignoring [a
subpoena duces tecum] and filing a motion to quash is what?

The answer is that the latter involves enlisting the aid of the
judiciary in resistance to the subpoena. That is why Mr. St.
Clair was "submitting the decision to the courts." (If that were
not so, he "would not have been there."81)
Nixon's claim was absolute executive privilege-executive
immunity, really-from the compulsory process of another
branch, on the ground of separation of powers. As I will argue
at greater length below, I believe this proposition has considerable merit as an inference from the structural autonomy of the
three branches. But, by the same token, the very idea of such a
claim of absolute executive immunity from the authority of another branch seems fundamentally inconsistent with going to
one of those other branches on bended knee, begging for the
permission of that branch to exercise what is asserted to be the
executive's constitutional privilege flowing from his structural
81. Oral Argument at 60-62, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(No. 73-1766, 1834); see supratext accompanying note 36.
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independence from the authority of the other branches and,
consequently, from their demands on him. If a constitutionally-based executive privilege exists at all, it is the constitutional prerogative of the President to decline, on grounds of
separation of powers, to accede to the demands of another
branch for access to executive branch communications and deliberations as of right and to seek to make his position prevail
in the political process. He is not constitutionally bound by
any other branch's determination of the scope of his duty to
comply with that branch's (or anybody else's) demands.
In the process of seeking to make his position prevail in
the political pull-and-tug of the interaction of the branches'
various powers, the President may, if he so chooses, try to enlist the aid of another branch (like the courts) against attempted incursions into what he believes is the Presidency's
sphere of constitutional autonomy. For example, the President
might seek judicial protection against congressional subpoenas, by opposing Congress's attempts to secure judicial enforcement or (more dubiously) by filing declaratory judgment
actions of his own. 82 Likewise, the President might enlist the
assistance of Congress, asking it to pass a statute providing for
enhanced executive privilege in the courts.
However, seeking the assistance of another branch-of the
courts, in particular-has risks. It has the feel of a "waiver" of
the right of the President to resist the purported incursion on
his own, if the court's judgment proves adverse to the President-witness the pained, awkward colloquy of James St. Clair
with the Supreme Court, set forth above.8 3 Moreover, the
President has no right to expect or demand that the courts will
see the issue his way. No branch is bound by the views of the
others as to the proper construction of the powers divided
among them-that is the essential premise justifying judicial
review and executive review. For the identical reasons that the
President is not bound by the Court's determination of the
scope of executive privilege, the Court surely is not bound,

82. The Reagan administration attempted this, in the infamous dispute
over congressional subpoenas of EPA documents that eventually led to the
investigation producing the Morrison v. Olson decision. See United States v.
House of Representatives of the United States, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1983); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 700 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the District Court was correct not to attempt to resolve
the dispute).
83. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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within the sphere of its authority, by the President's assertion
of absolute privilege. That was Nixon's lawyers' truly extravagant claim-and huge tactical blunder. Why would anyone expect the courts to hold that the existence and scope of a constitutionally-based presidential immunity from judicialprocess is
a matter solely for the President to decide, however he will,
subject to no review by the courts?
Aside from being naive, the claim is just flat-out wrong:
the fact of coordinacy and co-equality of the branches does not
imply a total immunity of each to the processes of the others; it
just means that no one branch is bound by another's views as
to whether such immunity exists. That does not mean that the
President is not amenable to judicial process (and that the Supreme Court should have so held); it means that he is not amenable to judicial process just because the judiciarysays so. The
fact that the judiciary is not supreme over the executive does
not mean that the President's assertion of immunity from judicial process must be endorsed by the judiciary, if the judiciary
is persuaded, in the exercise of its independent judgment, that
the Constitution supports no such rule. The Constitution establishes neither judicial supremacy over the executive nor judicial subordinacy to the executive's demands that the courts
recognize absolute executive immunity from judicial process.
The reasons President Nixon lost both the judicial battle
and the separation-of-powers war were (1) that the facts
tended to show his criminality (and thus made his assertions of
privilege and immunity seem disingenuous, indeed further
evidence of his abuse of power); and (2) that he had already
submitted the matter to the courts. 84 One simply cannot

84. President Clinton was not in a position to resist judicial rejection of
his claims of privilege and immunity in 1998, for similar reasons: the facts
and circumstances strongly suggest that Clinton invoked executive privilege
and other privileges for corrupt reasons-hiding his own wrongdoing-rather
than genuinely to protect the constitutional prerogatives of the Presidency. In
light of that, defiance of the Court's holdings-by, say, ordering aides not to
appear before the grand jury-would have been politically untenable. In addition, having litigated and lost the privilege battles in the courts would have
made any claim by Clinton that the courts' holdings did not matter politically
unacceptable for that reason as well. Finally, Clinton litigated his claims of
privilege in the shadow of Nixon, in two senses: First, the litigation was governed by the legal precedent of Nixon concerning the scope of executive privilege-a precedent unfavorable to the executive. See infra Part H. Second, the
litigation was "governed" by the political precedent of the Tapes Case: a
President whose actions are themselves the subject of inquiry must abide by
the courts' decisions concerning asserted privileges to withhold evidence rele-

1999]

UNITED STATES V. NIXON

1365

imagine the great practitioners of presidential power vis-h-vis
the courts-Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln-allowing a fundamental question of presidential power to be resolved by the courts
under such circumstances.
Consider President Jefferson, who tangled with Chief Justice John Marshall on more than one occasion on issues ofjudicial-versus-executive power. 85 Jefferson's consistent position
was that the judiciary has no right to issue orders to the President, the head of a coordinate branch, and expect that the
President will obey them where the President believes that
compliance would interfere with the powers or prerogatives of
the executive, interfere with the executive's performance of his
constitutional duties, or violate the executive's sense of what
the Constitution requires or prohibits.
This was Jefferson's position in response to the order to his
Secretary of State, James Madison, to appear and defend in
Marbury. Jefferson directed Madison not to show up. The administration did not litigate the merits of William Marbury's
claim for a commission, and President Jefferson almost surely
would have directed Secretary Madison not to deliver Marbury's commission had Marshall been so audacious as to order
it.86 The Marbury litigation, had it played out that way, would
have become an early and powerful precedent for the proposition that the courts are constitutionally unable to issue enforceable orders against the executive branch that involve
commands to the executive to take or refrain from taking certain action-the complete reverse of Nixon. (That Marbury
does not stand for such a proposition is a tribute to the judicial
politics of John Marshall who (unlike Nixon) knew when not to
take on a coordinate branch under circumstances where the
other branch was likely to win.)
vant to that inquiry.
85. I will use President Jefferson as the primary example here, though
the point could be expanded upon by discussion of President Jackson and
President Lincoln as well. In brief, Jackson did not treat the Marshall Court's
upholding of the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States as controlling his exercise of the constitutional power of the veto. See Paulsen, supra
note 10, at 259. Lincoln did not obey Taney's order in the Merryman case. See
Paulsen, supra note 42, at 95. Even more important are the cases Lincoln did
not allow to become judicial decisions, such as the constitutionality of secession, the validity of the North's suppression of the insurrection, the multitude
of questions concerning executive power under such circumstances, and the
constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation. Sometimes it's better not
to ask the courts for their opinion or permission.
86. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 307-08.
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This was also Jefferson's position with respect to John
Marshall's subpoena duces tecum in the Burr treason trial,
though he chose not to press his point.87 President Jefferson
provided the subpoenaed letter in question (after first making
some redactions).88 But a President's agreement to provide
material, or to provide testimony, does not establish judicial
supremacy over the executive; it could constitute the President's voluntary cooperation in a judicial proceeding that he
does not oppose on the merits (which was surely the case with
the prosecution of Aaron Burr).89
President Jefferson reserved his constitutional argument
for a letter to the prosecuting attorney for the United States,
Mr. George Hay. But that argument was not the Nixonian one
that the courts should grant the President an absolute privilege from compulsory judicial process,9 0 but that the President,
87. For a fascinating discussion of the intricacies and lessons of the Burr
case, see Professor John Yoo's contribution to this symposium. John C. Yoo,
The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and PresidentialPower, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1435 (1999). I have profited much from Professor Yoo's discussion of the
history and agree with virtually all of his conclusions. As the discussion in
the text indicates, however, I read the evidence somewhat more strongly in
favor of an understanding by President Jefferson that the Constitution does
not require the President to obey the orders of the judiciary with respect to
determinations of the scope of the President's constitutional powers. In my
view, Jefferson did not fight to the finish for this principle in the Burr case
because there was no practical reason not to provide the letters in question
and two powerful reasons to provide them: First and foremost, Jefferson
wanted Burr hung. Second, he did not want to furnish Burr (or Marshall) either a diversion or a pretext; quite the reverse, if Marshall were to steer the
trial to acquittal, Jefferson hoped at least to profit politically from that undesirable outcome. See Yoo, supra, at 144142 (discussing Jefferson's political
objectives).
88. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,694) ("ir. Hay presented a certificate from the president, annexed to a
copy of Gen. Wilkinson's letter, excepting such parts as he deemed he ought
not to permit to be made public.").
89. Many Presidents have provided testimony in judicial proceedings. See
Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1649-50 (1997) (describing testimony provided by sitting Presidents both voluntarily and in response to court orders).
In July 1998, President Clinton agreed "voluntarily" to testify before a grand
jury, and Independent Counsel Starr thereupon withdrew a subpoena requiring Clinton to appear, but it is difficult to believe that Clinton's "voluntary"
appearance was done because Clinton wished to cooperate with a judicial proceeding he supported on the merits. In this case, it appears more that Clinton
did not wish to fight the subpoena on constitutional grounds, at great political
cost, when it was clear (under Nixon) that he could not win.
90. Others have made an argument similar to Nixon's argument in support of President Clinton's claim to immunity from suit while in office in the
Clinton v. Jones case-i.e., that the Constitution requires courts to grant the

1999]

UNITED STATES V. NIXON

1367

as a matter of the Constitution's separation of powers, may
judge for himself whether and when it is proper to honor a judicial subpoena, or other judicial process, and may use the constitutional powers at his disposal to enforce his view.
The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the
Legislature, executive, and judiciary of each other, and none are more
jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the
latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could
bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from
north to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his
constitutional duties?9'

Jefferson's views on the relationship of the President to the
courts, expressed (mostly intra-executive) in Burr, are of a
piece with his famous remarks to Abigail Adams, in a letter
justifying his pardons and non-prosecutions of persons subject
to the infamous Sedition Act of the Adams administration:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given
them a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive
to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the
sphere of action assigned to them. The judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass sentence of fine and imprisonment;
because the power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.
But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were
bound to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided to them by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its
co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion
which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of
action, but for the legislature and executive also, in their spheres,
would make the judiciary a despotic branch.92

What, then, should the President's position be, when confronted with compulsory judicial process directed to him?
Should President Nixon have refused to obey Jaworski's subpoena? Should he have defied the Supreme Court's judgment?
And for today's front-burner issues, the questions are echoes of
Nixon: What should President Clinton's position have been
with respect to responding to civil litigation against him in his
personal capacity? Was the Court right or wrong in Clinton v.
President immunity from private-capacity civil litigation while he holds office.
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 718 (1995).
91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 1807), in 10
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERsON 403-04 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
92. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in
10 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERsON, supra note 91, at 89.
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Jones?93 What is the legally correct position for the President
to take with respect to assertion of privilege claims against an
Independent Counsel's grand jury subpoenas? Against a possible criminal indictment by a federal grand jury?
The answers to these specific questions must await consideration of the specific substantive constitutional question decided in Nixon: what is the proper scope of executive privilege
(or immunity) under the Constitution? My only points so far
have been that the judiciary's answer to that question ought to
be no more binding on the executive than the executive's is on
the judiciary; and that Nixon's assertion to the contrary is a
great constitutional error of enormous consequence to our constitutional order, but a relatively unsurprising one given the
circumstances presented to the Court by the legal claims and
illegal conduct of President Nixon.
II. NIXON & CLINTON: POINT OF PERSONAL (AND
EXECUTIVE) PRIVILEGE
My starting point in this section is the question addressed
in detail by a different panel of this symposium: is there really
such a thing as "executive privilege" under the Constitution
and, if so, what are its proper parameters? United States v.
Nixon, of course, is the seminal modern case on this point, and
the issues and variations presented in Nixon obviously remain
of tremendous importance today. Indeed, it is not too much to
say that the gravitational weight of the Nixon Tapes Case, if
not its specific holding, has led almost unavoidably to the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of presidential immunity
94
from defending a civil suit while in office (Clintonv. Jones ), to
the rejection by lower courts of claims of privilege concerning
communications between President Clinton and his advisors,
including government lawyers, against grand jury subpoenas
in the Independent Counsel's investigation of possible crimes
by Clinton and others, 95 to the emphatic rejection by lower
courts of claims of privilege for fact knowledge held by members of the President's personal Secret Service protective de-

93. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
94. Id.
95. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
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tail, 96 and to the obvious futility of presidential resistance to a
grand jury subpoena calling for his personal testimony-all
events that (along with the physical evidence of a stained
dress) helped to box President Clinton into admitting (in part)
a seven-month course of public deception and lies involving use
of the resources of the United States government, and which
likely involved numerous crimes of perjury and obstruction of
97
justice.
The legal holdings of the courts in these cases follow quite
readily from Nixon's rejection of the claim of absolute executive
immunity from compulsory judicial process and from application of Nixon's balancing test for consideration of privilege
claims: if the President may be compelled to produce taped
conversations of deliberations with his advisors in the oval office, it is hard to say that the President may not be compelled
to answer a civil lawsuit or provide deposition testimony at a
suitably convenient time for use in such a suit, upon a sufficient showing of need for such evidence. If Nixon is right in its
striking of the balance, Clinton is right, too. And if tapes of
presidential conversations with advisors are subject to subpoena in a criminal matter, testimony by persons present at
such conversations (the President or his advisors) is likewise
subject to subpoena, upon a like showing of need. The rule
should be no different with respect to conversations with government lawyers. They are government employees, representing the interests of the United States government, not the
(potentially conflicting) interests of the individual serving as
President, and thus may not claim attorney-client privilege
against the United States government (represented in these
matters by the Independent Counsel). They thus stand in no
96. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), reh'g denied, 146

F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998), stay denied, Office of the President v. Office of the
Independent Counsel, App. No. 1-108, 1998 WL 438524, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 4,
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
97. See generally COMMUNICATION FROM INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
KENNETH W. STARR, H.R. Doc. 105-310 (1998). The issues concerning the
likely criminality of President Clinton's actions have been so thoroughly discussed in so many sources that extensive citation of the debate is unnecessary. Nor do I wish to add to that literature here. Suffice it to say that there
is substantial evidence that could support a determination of actual criminality, and my discussion in the text frequently assumes familiarity with such
evidence and the inferences that most reasonable people have drawn concerning Clinton's conduct. The reference to Clinton's "Ulikely crimes" is not
meant to be contentious or provocative, but as a shorthand for the most probable generally accepted public judgment about the true state of the facts.
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government officials who may
different position than any other
98
possess relevant information.
Finally, if, as Nixon and Clinton hold, the President has no
constitutional immunity from compulsory judicial process, it
quite possibly follows that a sitting President may be indicted
and forced to stand trial for federal crimes. Nothing in the impeachment power precludes a criminal indictment and even
trial. To be sure, the framers no doubt expected that impeachment would precede indictment: a state prosecution of
the President would appear to present substantial constitutional issues of state interference with a federal instrumentality, under the reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryland.99 And a
98. For discussion of the attorney-client privilege issues in the government context, and the responsibilities of government lawyers to report information concerning possible criminal acts by government officials to the appropriate federal law enforcement authorities, notwithstanding a sense of
personal loyalty to the particular officeholders or employees involved, see
Paulsen, supra note 10; and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and
Government Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and Its Limits, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1998).

99. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); see also Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. at
1642 n.13:
Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law "the supreme Law
of the Land," Art. VI, cl.2, any direct control by a state court over the
President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws
are "faithfully executed," Art. H, § 3, may implicate concerns that are
quite different from the interbranch separation of powers questions

addressed here.
Still, any conclusion that a state grand jury indictment of a sitting President
would be unconstitutionalseems too strong- What of the case where a sitting
President commits rape or first degree murder, but no federal crime? Would a
state grand jury really be constitutionally barred from indicting him? The
most likely answer is that principles of federalism would preclude a state from
taking any physical action-arrest, imprisonment-against the President
without the cooperation or acquiescence of the federal government. Specifically, if Congress does not impeach and remove the President for committing
rape, murder, armed robbery, embezzlement of private funds, burglary, or
some other serious felony (and several defenders of President Clinton have
advanced the rather bracing argument, whether sincerely or for the present
case only, that the impeachment power does not extend to removal of a president for commission of felonies in his "private capacity"), it may be that the
President's refusal to appear, defend, or be bound by a judgment of conviction
renders any such state criminal proceeding ineffectual as a practical matter.
So long as the President retains the executive power of the United States government, a state court's criminal process against him is ineffective. Whether
this structural reality ought to require a state court judge to dismiss an indictment at the outset is a more troubling proposition. The practical resolution probably should be that the state grand jury legitimately may issue an
indictment but the President legitimately may refuse to appear if doing so
would interfere with the operation of the executive branch of government.
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federal prosecution would seem quite odd and remarkable-especially if a state prosecution were barred. Since federal
prosecutors are (or at least were, in the world before Nixon and
Morrison v. Olson), subordinates of the President, federal
prosecution of a sitting President would seem to have an underling prosecuting his own boss. Were it not for Nixon's sanctioning of a suit between the President and his subordinate, it
would otherwise seem to make sense to conclude that a criminal indictment could only follow the President's removal from
office through the political trial of impeachment. That at least
is the implication of the fundamental structural principle of
Article H, the unitary nature of the executive, and that appears
to have been the general premise under which the framers operated.
However, in a constitutional world of Special Prosecutors
and Independent Counsels subordinate to the President in
name only-the third disastrous legacy of Nixon 00-the premise that a federal prosecutor could never indict a sitting President is no longer valid. The Constitution does not, after all,
say that the President cannot be indicted; it merely says how
he may be impeached and specifies that an impeachment conviction does not bar a criminal prosecution. 101 The rest is all
inference from silence and extrapolation from structural and
practical assumptions that, in the world after Nixon and Morrison, no longer hold true.
Actually putting the President behind bars is a different
matter. It seems plain that impeachment is the exclusive
means of removing a President from office and physical incarceration, while not literally effecting a removal from office,
surely is the practical equivalent of removal of the powers of
the office (ingenious arguments about the President's ability to
The state courts are without constitutional power to compel the President's
submission to their judicial authority while he is in office and the President is
without constitutional power to insist that the indictment be dismissed. (He
may not even grant pardons for state law offenses.) Thus, a state grand jury's
criminal indictment of a sitting President, if otherwise consistent with constitutional requirements, stands as a state's expression of the importance of its
interest in enforcement of its criminal law-kind of a "free speech" interest in
pointing out that the President is acting unlawfully, not altogether different
in character from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves' condemnation of an
unconstitutional act of Congress. But the state's criminal law probably cannot
actually be enforced against a sitting President, without the cooperation of
Congress through the impeachment power.
100. See infra Part I.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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sign bills and receive ambassadors in prison to the contrary
notwithstanding). But that does not mean a President could
not be indicted-formally charged by a grand jury. The impeachment-punishment clause suggests a logical division
among the stages of a criminal prosecution: "the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment,
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to law."10 2 It
would seem that the first three stages-indictment, trial, and
judgment-do not have the effect of removal from office that
actual imposition of punishment (incarceration) would. While
it at one time might have seemed outlandish, it is not at all
clear in light of Clinton v. Jones that the President of the
United States may not be compelled to stand trial while in office: the President "is subject to judicial process in appropriate
circumstances," the Court said. 03 The fact that a federal
court's exercise of its jurisdiction "may significantly burden the
time and attention of the Chief Executive" does not create a
constitutional immunity of the President from compulsory judicial process. 104 Clinton v. Jones even found it "an abuse of
discretion" for the district court to have stayed the trial of a
civil suit until after the President leaves office. 105 "lD]elaying
trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the
loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall
specific facts, or the possible death of a party."106
The same considerations at least arguably apply in a
criminal case. There is no persuasive reason to think the
President should have a judicially-created absolute privilege
from trial for crimes against the United States while in office
but not have any such privilege from trial in a civil case, unless
the impeachment power forbids trial in one case but not the
other. Nothing in the impeachment clauses divests courts of
jurisdiction they otherwise have-impeachment merely provides a political-judicial process for removal from office. The
fact that the President may be impeached for commission of
criminal offenses does not mean he might not first be tried in
the courts for such offenses (as has happened with some federal judges Congress has impeached). 107 And if the President
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
117 S. Ct. at 1649.
Id. at 1648-49.
Id. at 1651.
Id.
See Don Van Natta, Jr., House ProsecutorsCompare Clinton to Judges
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were immune from prosecution on this score, that would be in
tension with Clinton v. Jones' denial of immunity from civil
suit while in office, since a serious civil wrong could, in the
judgment of Congress, constitute an impeachable offenceimagine for example a President who engaged in twelve proven
instances of non-criminal quid pro quo sexual harassment with
executive branch employees. 08 The fact that a wrongful act
might also provide grounds for impeachment does not itself
confer litigation immunity on the President for those acts. It
would not seem to make a principled difference whether the
non-impeachment litigation in question is civil or criminal. 0 9
If anything, the judicial system's interest in enforcement of the
criminal law would appear to be higher. 10
All of this-presidential amenability to civil suit; rejection
of executive privilege for Clinton's advisors; presidential amenability to grand jury subpoena; presidential amenability to
criminal indictment-seems to follow once it is conceded that
the President is, as a matter of constitutional law, subject to
the compulsory process of the courts and, further, that the
province of "executive privilege" is narrow, qualified, and defined by the judiciary's assessment of the importance of recogWho Lied and Were Ousted, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1999, § 1, at 26 (discussing

the Senate convictions of Judge Walter Nixon, who was found guilty of lying
before a federal grand jury prior to impeachment, and of Judge Alcee Hastings, who had been acquitted of bribery in state court).
108. I discuss (in general terms) the scope of the impeachment power below. See infra text accompanying note 158.
109. To be sure, the President possesses the power to grant pardons for
federal crimes. While some have argued that the pardon power does not permit a president to pardon himself, see, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, Note, PardonMe?:
The ConstitutionalCase Against PresidentialSelf-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779

(1996), the dominant view is that the President's pardon power is plenary. In
any event, however, the bare existence of a pardon power does not confer an
immunity from indictment or prosecution. It just means that the indictment
or prosecution could be negated in the event the President were in fact to
grant himself a pardon.
110. The discussion in the text is not a prediction of what the Supreme
Court would hold if presented with the issue today. Rather, my argument is
that the logical implications of Nixon and Clinton (combined with Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)) suggest this outcome. Courts, of course, do not
always follow the logical implications of their prior holdings.
It follows, almost a fortiori, from the argument in the text, that the courts
may subject a President to contempt sanctions for abuse of the judicial process, whether or not the acts constituting such abuse are also punishable as
crimes. Once again, the Clinton situation has become the leading precedent
on this point. Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 1999 WL 202909 (E.D. Ark
Apr. 12, 1999).
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nizing it in a given context. In the myriad legal battles involving President Clinton, we have seen new applications of
Nixon, and Clinton has lost all of the judicial battles over these
issues."' Independent Counsel Starr spared the presidency a
formal ruling that the President may be subpoenaed to give
testimony to a grand jury (which was the inevitable answer after Nixon and Clinton v. Jones) by allowing President Clinton
to testify "voluntarily" and not subpoenaing him to testify subsequently, after Clinton refused to answer certain questions.1 12
But the outcome of the negotiation is probably nearly as important a precedent as if it had come from a reported judicial ruling: the President lost again. And we may yet be presented
with the question of whether a sitting President may be in13
dicted.
I would like to take a step back, however, and ask if
Nixon's holding that the President possesses a qualified, constitutional privilege against judicial process makes sense as an
original matter. The Constitution's answer strikes me as painfully obvious-painful, because Nixon's answer labors so hard
to squeeze a balancing test out of a constitutional text that so
plainly does not provide one; and obvious, because the correct
answer strikes me as clear, the moment one steps out of a judicial supremacist mindset.
The answer to the riddle of executive privilege lies at the
intersection of two propositions. First, as Nixon correctly recognized, the constitutional structure of separate, independent
branches necessarily implies that each branch properly possesses a sphere of constitutional autonomy in its operations,
with which the other branches may not rightfully interfere.
That principle necessarily suggests the right of the executive to
some degree of confidentiality, vis-h-vis the other branches, in
executive branch deliberations concerning matters within the
province of the President's responsibilities under Article II of
the Constitution (which is quite a broad province) and some
degree of immunity from the compulsory processes or demands
of the other branches.1 4 In other words, yes, there is such a
thing as a constitutionally-based executive privilege. Nixon
111. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 21.
113. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Starr Is Weighing Whether to Indict Sitting
President,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al.
114. Some supporting evidence for these premises is contained in Paulsen,
supra note 10, at 228-40, 252-57.
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was right in finding that executive privilege has a constitutional basis.115
But the second point is that the text of the Constitution
quite obviously does not supply any rule of law for courts to
apply concerning the proper scope of executive privilege. Nixon
was wrong to take this silence as authorizing the Court to invent a rule of its own liking (and, of course to make it a suitably mushy rule, since the Constitution does not really supply a
rule at all). 16 Instead, I submit, the correct answer is that the
115. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) ("Nowhere in the
Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a
privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based.").
Writing soon after the Nixon case was decided, Professor William Van
Alstyne argued that, aside from some "very narrow zone of implied power
without which [the President] would be quite unable to perform his express
duties at all," executive privilege is a function of Congress's powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 118-19. There
is much to Van Alstyne's argument, but it shortchanges considerations of executive branch autonomy flowing from the Constitution's structural separation of the branches. As I argue presently, however, that is a matter to be determined by the give-and-take among the branches-the executive branch
fighting for its view against Congress and the courts. I agree with Van Alstyne to the extent his argument suggests that the Constitution does not supply a rule concerning the proper scope of executive privilege and that the
courts therefore cannot properly find as a rule of law that the President possesses a constitutional privilege any broader than that which is strictly necessary to perform his duties.
Professor Saikrishna Prakash, in his contribution to this symposium,
makes a very similar argument. See Prakash, supra note 15. Professor Prakash emphasizes even more strongly than Professor Van Alstyne that the usefulness and utility of executive privilege as a means for the effective carrying
out of executive power does not itself make it a constitutional power of the
President; rather, it suggests that the privilege falls solely within Congress's
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
The difference between Prakash's and Van Alstyne's perspective and
mine is that I do not see executive privilege as a "power" of government at all,
but an immunity of the President from the powers of other branches. Executive privilege is not a coercive power with which the President can "do" something to someone else. It thus does not seem to me the sort of thing that Congress has power to control as a means of "carrying into execution" executive
powers. It is, rather, a privilege-a defensive shield-that flows from the
separation of powers and the autonomy of each branch within its sphere. If
one accepts this view of what executive privilege is-not a power, but a privilege-one can accept all of Professor Prakash's arguments in principle about
the power of Congress to control the incidental means for "carrying into execution" the executive powers of Article II and still not accept his conclusion
that executive privilege lacks a constitutional basis.
116. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-13. The signal that a mushy balancing test
is coming comes in the opening words of the paragraph that starts to explain
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scope of executive privilege, as an incident of the autonomy of
the executive from the other branches, is a function of the circumstances of any particular situation and the vigor with
which the executive branch resists the demands of the other
two branches of government for information or materials concerning confidential executive branch deliberations, or for the
personal presence of executive branch officers, and the result of
the struggles between or among the branches on this pointnot a function of a judicial balancing test.
This answer is of a piece with my discussion above, criticizing Nixon's holding ofjudicial supremacy over the executive.
If ever there was an issue for which judicial hegemony was inappropriate, it would be one like executive privilege, for which
there is a constitutional basis flowing from implications of the
separation of powers, but no constitutional rule of law fairly
discernible from text or structure. It is the President's autonomy and his independent duty and prerogative to interpret the
Constitution that gives rise to the President's constitutional
power to assert and, to the extent he can, maintain a sphere of
executive privilege and immunity as against the other
branches. Executive privilege is a function of independent
presidential power to interpret the Constitution, not judicial
power to interpret the Constitution.
Does this mean that executive privilege issues are nonjusticiable "political questions?" Not quite-and certainly not in
the sense in which the so-called political question doctrine has
been articulated by the Supreme Court. The scope of executive
privilege is not the subject of a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," (i.e., the executive) under the first branch of the political question doctrine.l17
Quite the contrary, executive
privilege is an inference of indefinite extent from constitutional
structure and relation-a penumbra, if you will-not the subject of a clear textual command.
Nor is the judiciary obliged to recognize a de facto absolute
executive privilege against compulsory judicial process simply
because of a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving" executive privilege claims-the buzz-

it: "In this case we must weigh...." Id. at 711. For the Court's full test, see
infra text accompanying note 125.
117. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
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118
words of the second branch of the political question doctrine.
Certainly the judiciary has a presumptive power to issue compulsory process to all persons in a case in which it has jurisdiction. The absence of a constitutional rule of privilege does not
mean that anyone who claims a privilege wins; the absence of a
standard could as easily lead to the conclusion that the privilege does not exist at all. A "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" does not tell a court how to decide a
claim of executive privilege against compulsory judicial process. It merely tells the court that the Constitution supplies no
rule for the court to apply; the "law" (if any) on this issue must
come from someplace else." 9
Least of all is the judiciary obliged to defer entirely to the
executive on privilege issues merely because of "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government" or because of "an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made" or because of
"the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro120
nouncements by various departments on one question."
Taken seriously, this grab-bag of miscellaneous political question principles would mean that courts should never get involved in separation of powers cases at all, even when the Con-

118. Id.
119. I have written elsewhere that the "textual commitment" and "absence
ofjudicially discoverable standards" branches of the political question doctrine
are not true "nonjusticiability" doctrines but in actuality are two different
substantiveholdings. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A GeneralTheory of Article
V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 677, 713 (1993); see also Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion"
Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597, 600-01 (1976). A decision holding that resolution
of a particular issue is committed to another branch is a substantive ruling on
the meaning of the Constitution: the Constitution supplies a rule, and that
rule is that the decision lies within the exclusive province of another branch.
Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. at 228. A decision finding a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" is also a substantive ruling on
the meaning of the Constitution: the Constitution supplies no rule of law, and
so decision of the case depends on some other source of law or on some baseline default rule (such as that the challenged action is not disturbed by the
courts). See Paulsen, supra, at 713 & nn. 124-27. In the case of a claim of executive privilege, there is no basis for choosing between a baseline default rule
that the privilege claim succeeds and a baseline rule that the Constitution
fails to supply a rule invalidating the issuance of compulsory judicial process,
so that the privilege claim fails.
120. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; accord Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
518-19 (1969); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941 (1983); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-90 (1990).

1378

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1337

stitution does supply a rule of law to be applied. Nor, taking
such principles seriously, should courts ever hold congressional
acts unconstitutional. Such a free-form principle of pseudo"restraint" (abdication, really) has no place in our constitutional order.
Such a notion is certainly not what I propose for questions
of executive privilege. Rather, executive privilege questions
are "political" constitutional questions in the straightforward
sense that their resolution cannot pretend to come from a rule
supplied by the Constitution's text, structure, or history. Their
resolution is determined by the constitutional politics of the
situation. A court, which can only apply rules of law, has no
constitutional rule on which to base a decision disturbing the
status quo ante, and thus may not properly purport (except,
perhaps, in the most extreme of cases) to settle a claim of executive privilege or immunity on constitutional grounds.
Where the Constitution supplies a rule, the courts must apply
it. Where the Constitution fails to supply a rule but a constitutional principle is implicated, the courts have no warrant for
making up a balancing test to try to "split the difference."
They must simply hold that the Constitution fails to supply a
rule of law for courts to apply, even though a constitutional
principle is implicated. A court can do no more in the name of
the Constitution-at least not if they are being faithful to the
judicial role. Thus, outside of extreme cases, a claim of consti-.
tutional executive privilege should have no status in the courts,
and should supply no defense to an otherwise appropriate judicial subpoena, summons, or other order. 121
What a court can do, however-and what Congress has
specifically empowered the federal courts to do-is to recognize
and develop the common law of privileges.122 This common law
could reasonably include a policy-based executive privilege for
which the Constitution fails to supply a rule governing its
practical application. It could take into account the fact.that
the Constitution provides a constitutional principle justifying
such a privilege, even though it fails to provide a constitutional
121. So explicated, it is not clear that my position is radically different
from Professor Van Alstyne's and Professor Prakash's at all, see supra note
115: the text of the Constitution supplies no rule of law for courts to apply
concerning executive privilege, and courts may not in the name of the Constitution infer such a rule and apply it to trump other applicable substantive law
providing for compulsory process.
122. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
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rule mandating one. It could also take into consideration the
executive branch's considered views in this regard-as well as
the executive's expected response to the Court's decision, in the
exercise of its independent duties under the Constitution. In
short, the courts' common law development of the privilege
could take into account constitutional concerns, as well as accommodate the view of the judiciary to the view of the executive.123
To the extent executive privilege claims are presented in
federal courts, then, it follows that the courts may recognize
and apply something like the Nixon Tapes Case's description of
the privilege, as a matter of the common law of privilege. That
is not what the Nixon opinion purported to do, of course-the
Court purported to derive its balancing test straight from the
Constitution, in typical early-1970s judicial activist fashion 124-but it is a better description of what the Court was in
reality doing, and a better normative account of the extent to
which what the Court was doing can be regarded as legitimate.
But even as common law judicial privilege doctrine, however, Nixon is wanting. It is both too broad-in its apparent
carte blanche to the President, if he invokes the magic words
"national security"-and, for most purposes, far too narrow.
Worse, it suffers from all the imprecisions and uncertainties of
unfocused, multi-factor balancing tests. Here is the Nixon
Court's statement of its "test," in all its splendor (with snide
commentary thrown in along the way):
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in performance
of the President's responsibilities ["weigh" using what kind of scale?]
against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of
criminal justice. [Guess which branch is going to win the judiciary's
balance.] The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed
[weighty indeed-how reassuring!] and entitled to great respect
[which the Court will now disparage in practice]. However [here it

123. On accommodation, in this sense, see Paulsen, supra note 10, at 33740; see also id. at 332-37 (discussing the idea of "deference" as distinguished
from "accommodation").
124. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe and Nixon, the two
most important constitutional decisions of the 1970s, resemble one another in
methodology: a constitutional "principle" is inferred, at a highly abstract level
of generality, the Court then fashions a highly specific, quasi-legislative "test"
to implement this principle; finally, that test is read back into the constitutional text as if the text actually stated such a rule. See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (similar methodology for Establishment
Clause issues).
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comes], we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the
candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in
the context of a criminal prosecution. [Perhaps a fair point, if somewhat weak. I'm curious, though: why are Supreme Court deliberations secret9l
On the other hand [balancing, balancing, all is balancing], the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably
relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of
due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts
[with which we are much more familiar and thus value more highly].
A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature [so it should lose every
time?], whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration ofjustice. [Yep, a general claim of confidentiality will lose almost every
time, as against a specific claim of evidentiary need.] Without access
to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated.
[Nixon is a crook, and is just protecting his henchmen.] The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be
vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. [It
will be vitiated whenever the courts vitiate it, and deterred in other
cases. More importantly here, Nixon is a crook.]
We conclude [this is the rule of the case:] that when the ground
for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process
of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized
assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need
for evidence in a pending criminal trial.125

Once again, what seems to be driving the balancing in this case
is the reality the Court knows from the sealed record: Nixon
was involved in criminal activity. But the Court cannot quite
bring itself to say so. And so it settles on an imprecise formulation that, ironically, gives even legitimate deliberations between the President of the United States and his most senior
advisors concerning matters of national policy less legal protection than is given for attorney-client communications concerning the most ordinary of matters. The confidentiality of presidential conversations is subject to ex post balancing, and
consequent uncertainty-factors that the Court has recently

125. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13 (1974) (footnotes omitted) (cynical commentary added).
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found unacceptably dangerous to the attorney-client privi126
lege.
In stark contrast, attorney-client communications are almost absolutely protected, absent use of the relationship for a
crime or fraud. That last proviso is key: the attorney-client
privilege applies absent use of the relationship for a crime or
fraud.12 7 An analogous standard supplies a better common law
rule than Nixon's rule. Surely the policy interests in protecting
the confidentiality of presidential conversations with advisors,
concerning matters of national policy within the scope of the
President's Article II province (and not just military or diplomatic matters), in order to enable the President to receive uninhibited, fully-informed advice, is at least as great as the policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of attorney-client
communications. If courts are concerned that such confidentiality might be abused as a cover for criminal activity, they
should hold-just as with attorney-client privilege-that the
privilege must yield in the face of a sufficient showing of probability that the communication was in furtherance of a crime or
fraud, and not for the legitimate purpose of providing or obtaining advice on confidential matters not implicating illegal
conduct. 128

126. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2086-87 (1998)
(rejecting argument that attorney-client privilege will not be greatly impaired
because of the limited nature of proposed exception where client is deceased
and there is a demonstrated substantial need for the information in a criminal
proceeding).
[A] client may not know at the time he discloses information to his
attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil or a criminal matter, let alone whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing
ex post the importance of the information against client interests,
even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty
into the [attorney-client] privilege's application. For just that reason,
we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of
the privilege.
Id. at 2087. For an analysis of the Swidler & Berlin case, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Dead Man's Privilege: Vince Foster and The Demise of Legal Ethics
(Nov. 15, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review). While I believe that Swidler & Berlin was incorrectly decided, the argument against ex post balancing and uncertainty is a strong one and persuasively (although perhaps unintentionally) refutes United States v. Nixon on
this score.
127. See infra note 128 (discussing cases).
128. The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege generally
permits the party seeking to invoke the exception to obtain in camera inspection by a court upon "a showing of a factual basis adequate to support a good
faith belief by a reasonable person' that in camera review... may reveal evi-
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That is the reality of what the Nixon opinion holds, though
it is not (quite) what the Nixon opinion says. The formula for
the judicial common law of executive privilege, however, should
reflect both its policy justification and its reality limitation. I
propose a rule along the lines of the following, closely tracking
the basic elements of the common law attorney-client privilege:
(1) Confidential communications
(2) between officers, employees, or other members of the
executive branch of the United States government,
acting within the scope of their employment,
(3) for purposes of formulating or implementing executive branch policy or providing advice to the President,
(4) concerning governmental matters within the fairly
arguable scope of the executive branch's Article H
constitutional powers,
(5) are, at the direction of the incumbent President or
his designee,
(6) protected from compelled disclosure by any court or
by Congress,
(7) absent waiver,
(8) unless the communications are made for the purpose
of furthering a crime or fraud.12 9
dence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies." United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989); see also In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d
46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing standard necessary, upon in camera review,
to establish the crime-fraud exception: "The government satisfies its burden of
proof if it offers evidence that if believed by the trier of fact would establish
the elements of an ongoing or imminent crime or fraud."); In re Sealed Case,
754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Marc Rich & Co. v. United States,
731 F.2d 1032, 1039 (2d Cir. 1984) (framing test as one of "probable cause to
believe that a crime or fraud had been committed and that the communications were in furtherance thereof).
129. Compare this formulation with Wigmore's classic formulation of the
attorney-client privilege:
[1] Where legal advice of any kind is sought
[2] from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
[3] the communications relating to that purpose,
[4] made in confidence
[5] by the client,
[6] are at his instance permanently protected
[7] from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
[8] except the protection be waived.
8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaugton ed., 1961).
The courts have power to adopt the version of executive privilege pro-
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Under this test, President Nixon still loses, for all the reasons subtly identified by the Court in the Nixon opinion: if
there was substantial "independent evidence of a conspiracy"
to support admissibility of the conversations under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (as the Court held in
Nixon), 130 there was undoubtedly sufficient evidence in the
sealed record before the Court "to support a good faith belief by
a reasonable person, that in camera review... may reveal evidence to establish the claim that the crime-fraud exception applies" (the "crime-fraud" standard as it exists with respect to
the attorney-client privilege). 131 Applying a "crime-fraud" exception to a broad executive privilege should thus yield in camera review of the materials or testimony in question to see if
there is in fact sufficient justification for overruling the claim
of privilege. And in camera review is exactly what the Nixon
opinion ordered. The end result is the same, but with the difference that the executive branch is not weakened just because
Nixon was a crook: the privilege claim is rejected, Nixon is
forced to cough up the so-called "smoking gun" tape, and resigns very shortly after his criminality is exposed to public
view.132
posed in the text as a matter of the common law of executive privilege to be
applied in federal courts. (They can do this whether or not Nixon's constitutional holding is rejected. To the extent my proposed common law formulation is broader, it does not contradict Nixon, but expands on it.) By the same
token, Congress has power (under the Necessary and Proper Clause) to adopt
such a broadened standard for executive privilege claims, whether or not the
courts adhere to Nixon as setting a constitutional floor. To the extent that
executive privilege is thought to exist purely as a matter of judicial common
law development, of course, Congress may displace judicial doctrine with
whatever rule it thinks most appropriate.
130. 418 U.S. at 701.
131. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted).
132. The ending of the story is worth retelling briefly, because it again contrasts so sharply with the events involving President Clinton twenty-five
years later. (I am indebted to Professor Van Alstyne's article once again for
this account of events. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 127-30.) Following
the Supreme Court's decision in the Nixon Tapes Case, the mandate issued
quickly and the case was returned to Judge Sirica in the District Court for in
camera inspection of the subpoenaed tapes. Sirica directed Nixon's personal
lawyer, James St. Clair, personally to listen to the subpoenaed tapes (quite
possibly to assure that there would not be any new eighteen-and-a-half minute gaps). See id. at 128-29. I turn to Van Alstyne's account:
On Monday, August 5th [1974], the full consequences linked with
these quickening developments became apparent when the President
admitted that he had previously misstated the extent of his knowledge of the Watergate burglary, that he had in fact attempted to impede the F.B.I. inquiry, and that he had knowingly withheld this in-
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Under this proposed crime-fraud exception to a strong executive privilege, it is most probable that President Clinton's
claims of executive privilege concerning conversations with
Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal would also have lost
(just as they in fact lost under the Nixon analysis). Some of
those conversations probably did not fall within the ambit of
formation from the House Judiciary Committee as well as from his
own counsel, contrary to his numerous earlier public statements. A
story in the Washington Post the following day ventured an explanation for the President's wholly unexpected, and fatal, admission.
Claiming access to information from a suitably knowledgeable source,
the story asserted that Mr. St. Clair had listened to a tape establishing these devastating facts. Resolving his ethical and legal responsibilities appropriately, Mr. St. Clair had allegedly advised the President that he would be forced to resign and to advise the district court
of the truth of the matter, to avoid complicity in any continuing misrepresentation.
Id. at 129 (footnotes omitted). President Nixon resigned within three days of
the disclosure.
A lot has changed in legal ethics in the past twenty-five years. While
the formal rules have in some respects become more clear in insisting on lawyer candor to the court and forbidding assistance to client illegality, the practice of prominent attorneys in high profile matters-including President
Clinton's-has clearly become less ethical and honorable. At some point, very
shortly after it had become publicly known that the President in all probability had made false and misleading statements in his civil deposition in the
Jones litigation, the President's private attorneys in that civil matter (Robert
Bennett) and the resulting criminal investigation (David Kendall) knew or
should have known of their client's ongoing fraud on the courts. (Bennett
himself was implicated, unwittingly, in the fraud.) Whether or how strongly
Bennett or Kendall counseled rectification of the fraud we cannot know for
certain. (To echo Senator Howard Baker's famous Watergate question, "What
did the President's lawyers know, and when did they know it?") But we do
know this: the President did not in fact rectify his false statements. Instead,
he employed these lawyers to attempt to delay and prevent disclosure of facts
from other witnesses which could expose the falsity. When those efforts ultimately failed, the President employed these same lawyers to help him prepare
testimony before a federal grand jury defending the false statements as in fact
"legally accurate." The House of Representatives ultimately impeached
Clinton over that falsity (and other false statements to the criminal grand
jury), not the original falsity of his civil deposition testimony. And, finally, we
know that neither Bennett nor Kendall resigned from the representation of
the President.
The ethical and honorable equivalent of James St. Clair is nowhere to
be found among the leading attorneys representing President Clinton twentyfive years later. No one, apparently, was willing to speak legal truth to corrupt power, as St. Clair was to Nixon; and no one, apparently, was willing to
resign rather than act in complicity with, and in furtherance of their client's
misdeeds. For further discussion of this point, see Stephen Gillers, A Fool for
a Client?, AM. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 74, 74-75. On the question of the ethics of
the government attorneys involved in the Clinton affair, see Paulsen, supra
note 98, at 96-104.
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deliberations concerning executive branch policy or decisionmaking. 33 Furthermore, U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway
Johnson's opinion rejecting Clinton's claim of executive privilege (which Clinton then abandoned in the Court of Appeals, in
134
favor of fighting only the attorney-client privilege issue) with
respect to Clinton's conversations with these persons comes
close to suggesting that the Independent Counsel's in camera
submission provided a basis for believing these conversations
were likely to have been made in furtherance of deception and
possible illegality: "If there were instructions from the President to obstruct justice or efforts to suborn perjury, such actions likely took the form of conversations involving the Presi135
dent's closest advisors, including Lindsey and Blumenthal."
It doesn't take too much to read between the lines: the Independent Counsel had made a sufficient evidentiary showing,
as early as spring 1998, that conversations between Clinton
and advisors Blumenthal and Lindsey likely were not for purposes of legitimate deliberations concerning governmental
matters. Rather, there was a substantial possibility that the
conversations at issue were in furtherance of a crime or fraud.
Judge Johnson's opinion in the district court does not explicitly
invoke a crime-fraud exception rationale because she was
working within the parameters of executive privilege set by
Nixon and by D.C. Circuit precedent applying Nixon. 136 But
the simple point remains: as with Nixon, the outcome is probably the same whether one employs Nixon's balancing test or a
133. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (noting that several of the conversations on
which Deputy White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey invoked attorney-client
privilege did not involve Lindsey acting in his capacity as an attorney, but
concerned political or policy discussions).
134. After Clinton had filed a notice of appeal from the district court's decision rejecting both executive and attorney-client privilege in the combined
Lindsey and Blumenthal cases, the Office of Independent Counsel petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment. At that point,
probably to lessen the sense of importance of the case and discourage granting
of the writ, Clinton abandoned the executive privilege claim. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 477.
135. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 29 (D.D.C.) affd in
part,rev'd in partsub nom., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, and cert denied, 119

S. Ct. 466 (1998); see also id. at 28-29 (discussing the Independent Counsel's
ex parte submission).
136. See id. at 25 (citing Nixon and In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 743
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (the "Espy case") as providing the relevant legal framework
for the district court's consideration of executive privilege claims); see generally id. at 25-30.
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more protective common law executive privilege with an exception for communications in furtherance of a crime or fraud. As
with Nixon, the latter approach is a more straightforward explanation for what is really going on in the case. The subtext
of the District Court's opinion in the Clinton privilege case, as
with the Nixon case, is that evidence in the sealed record
showed substantial reason to believe that the President of the
137
United States was a crook.
President Clinton's claims of executive attorney-client
privilege fail, too. The short explanation, as alluded to above,
is that the "client" in this situation is the United States government, not Bill Clinton personally, and the United States
government is represented in the matter by Independent
Counsel Starr. As both the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit
have held, there is no governmental attorney-client privilege
against the government. 138 Important to both the Eighth Circuit's and especially the D.C. Circuit's judgment was the
anomaly that would exist if presidential conversations with attorney-advisors were more privileged than presidential conversations with non-attorney advisors. As the D.C. Circuit put it:
The Supreme Court's recognition in United States v. Nixon of a
qualified privilege for executive communications severely undercuts
the argument of the Office of the President regarding the scope of the
government attorney-client privilege. A President often has private
conversations with his Vice President or his Cabinet Secretaries or
other members of the Administration who are not lawyers or who are
lawyers, but are not providing legal services. The advice these officials give the President is of vital importance to the security and
prosperity of the nation, and to the President's discharge of his constitutional duties. Yet upon a proper showing, such conversations
must be revealed in federal criminal proceedings. Only a certain conceit among those admitted to the bar could explain why legal advice
should be on a higher plane than advice about policy, or politics, or
why a President's conversation with the most junior lawyer in the
White House Counsel's Office is deserving of more protection from
disclosure in a grand jury investigation than a President's discussions
137. Subsequent testimony of Mr. Blumenthal provided support for the
charge that the President attempted to obstruct justice by planting misinformation with key advisors, knowing that it would be repeated to the grand jury
investigating the President.
See COMMUNICATION FROM INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR, supra note 97, at 128 n.1116-22.
138. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 466 (1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997). I have written elsewhere that the
best explanation for the result in these two cases is that the government's attorney-client privilege is controlled in these circumstances by the Independent
Counsel. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 479.
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with his Vice President or a Cabinet Secretary. In short, we do not
believe that lawyers are more important to the operations of government than all other officials, or that the advice lawyers render is
of the Presidency than the advice
more crucial to the functioning
139
coming from all other quarters.

Nixon's executive privilege analysis unquestionably affected the courts' evaluation of executive branch attorney-client
privilege in Lindsey and in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum.140 Under my reformulation of common law executive
privilege, the two privileges would almost completely overlap,
not because of any narrowing of government attorney-client
privilege but because of broadening of the common law executive privilege. Conversations with or among administration attorneys should stand on no different footing with respect to
"privilege" in the courts than conversations with or among nonattorney executive branch personnel.
This approach to common law executive privilege also provides an appropriate framework within which to evaluate the
Clinton administration's assertion of an unprecedented Secret
Service "protective functions" privilege. As a free-standing
evidentiary privilege, the claim borders on the absurd, and the
courts-the district court, a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit, a unanimous vote to deny rehearing en banc by the D.C.
Circuit, an emphatic stay denial by Chief Justice Rehnquistwere right to reject it.141 What made the Clinton administration's claim so extreme and untenable was that it sought to
keep Secret Service agents-law enforcement officials-from
testifying as to facts and observationsrelevant to a criminal investigation, not just communications to which they were privy
by virtue of their need to be in close physical proximity to the
President. Independent Counsel Starr apparently did not even
seek the latter. That is as it should be. Just as the attorneyclient privilege may extend to persons whose presence or inclusion is necessary to the attorney-client relationship (investigators, paralegals, secretaries), so too the presence of Secret
Service agents is necessary for many of the President's meet139. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1114 (citations omitted).
140. See Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 919 (arguing that common law
attorney-client privilege should not provide a shield to disclosure where constitutionally-based executive privilege would not).
14L See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied
en banc, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), stay denied, 148 F.3d 1079
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), stay denied, 119 S. Ct. 1, and cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
461 (1998).
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ings and conversations. The content of the communications
themselves should remain privileged, notwithstanding the
presence of a Secret Service agent. But just as the attorneyclient privilege does not extend to the attorney's observations
of the client (including such matters as physical appearance
and demeanor,)14 2 so too there is no "executive privilege" extension that should bar a Secret Service agent from testifying concerning facts and observations based on his personal pres143
ence.
Finally, there is the "privilege" issue of asserted presidential immunity from civil suit while in office. The common law
privilege I have described is an evidentiary privilege, not an
immunity from judicial process itself, and thus would not affect
the result in Clinton v. Jones. The Jones decision has been
much-maligned by defenders of President Clinton, but this
seems more because of its consequences (as if Clinton's subsequent perjury were somehow the Supreme Court's fault!) than
any defect in its reasoning. Clinton v. Jones is plainly correct
either under Nixon or under this modified version of it. There
is no common law basis for finding presidential immunity from
compulsory judicial process in a case otherwise proper for judicial resolution. At most, courts have a power to control the
timing and procedures of litigation. Nor does the Constitution
supply any rule of presidential immunity for courts to apply. If
the President is thought not to be subject to compulsory judicial process in a particular case, on constitutional grounds, it
can only be because of the President's assertion of a constitutional power to refuse to honor judicial process and his political
success in doing so.14
142. See

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
264 (2d ed. 1994) ("[The physical characteristics of a client, such
as complexion, demeanor and dress, are not generally considered privileged... ."). The same applies to client whereabouts, client identity, and fee
arrangements. See id. at 264-65; see also United States v. Hodge & Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
143. An exception might exist where disclosure of the fact of a particular
presidential or executive branch meeting, or of the persons involved in such
meeting, would itself constitute disclosure of the content of "communications"
intended to be confidential. Again, there is an analog in the common law of
attorney-client privilege. Normally, a client's identity is not covered by the
privilege. Under some circumstances, however, the client's identity itself constitutes a confidential communication. See Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d at 1353
(citing the "Bairdexception," Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630 (9th Cir.
1960)).
144. I must therefore side with the unanimous Supreme Court against my
LAWYERING
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As noted above, it was politically untenable for President
Nixon to resist the Court's holding that the President is subject
to the Court's authority and that he must turn over the tapes.
I doubt, however, that it would have been politically impossible
for President Clinton to refuse to accede to the Court's judgment in Clinton v. Jones in the summer and fall of 1997. Indeed, I think Clinton could have pulled it off: "I respect the
Court's judgment, but for the sake of the Presidency I must
disagree with it and refuse to permit the Presidency to be held
hostage to private litigants in civil cases. I have instructed my
attorneys to notify the district court that we will not file an answer or participate further in this matter. If the court wishes
to enter a default judgment, it may do so, but I will not allow
the Office of the Presidency to be subjected to a spectacle and
an indignity, merely to preserve my reputation and public
standing."'145
As matters turned out, this would have been a better
"strategy" for Clinton than lying at his deposition. The problem of course turns out to have been, in the Jones suit as well
as with the subsequent assertions of privilege against Independent Counsel Starr's investigation, that Clinton was not
genuinely concerned with the Presidency, but only with his
reputation and public standing, and was willing to lie to protect the latter even at great cost to the former. As with President Nixon, bad Presidents have once again made bad law.

friend Akhil Amar on the question of whether the Constitutioncreates a mandatory judicial obligation to grant the President immunity from civil suit
while in office. See Amar & Katyal, supra note 90. Amar & Katyal's historical
arguments-particularly their reliance on Jefferson's views-support my conclusion that the President rightfully may refuse to honor compulsory judicial
process as a matter of assertion of his own constitutional independence, not
the conclusion that the Constitution creates a rule of temporary presidential
immunity that binds the courts. Amar & Katyal almost entirely ignore the
key relevant precedent that sunk Clinton's claims: United States v. Nixon.
145. I first proposed this notion at a lunch with faculty members at the
University of Utah College of Law, following a presentation in October 1997.
It has since become fashionable-following Clinton's deposition, the explosion
of the Lewinsky affair into public view, the resulting Independent Counsel
investigation, and the impeachment of President Clinton-for Mondaymorning quarterbacks to argue that this is what Clinton should have done,
and that this is what his lawyers should have advised him to do. At the time,
however, such an idea would have been thought an almost outlandish defiance
of the Supreme Court's authority, on par with Nixon refusing to turn over the
tapes. (Our notions of what would be "unthinkable" presidential actions have
shrunk significantly in the time that has elapsed since fall of 1997, however.)
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Executive privilege is properly a doctrine of presidential
prerogative to be pressed by Presidents exercising their own
prerogative, not beseeching the blessing of the courts. The judicial role is to recognize common law privileges, not to create a
constitutional balancing test out of the penumbras of the Constitution's empowerments of each branch to resist the encroachments of the others. In a perfect constitutional world,
presidential assertion of a constitutional immunity from compulsory judicial process and judicial recognition of a common
law privilege for executive communications would tend to converge at a common core of consensus as to the proper scope of
executive privilege-perhaps along the lines I have sketched
for the common law privilege. Rarely, if ever, would a President acting in good faith require any broader privilege than the
executive privilege I have outlined, which is extremely deferential to the executive. The need for autonomy does not justify a
privilege that would protect communications not related to the
President's performance of his constitutional role, or that involve a crime or fraud. The rule I propose would seem fully to
protect the interests of the Presidency in assuring the degree of
immunity from compulsory judicial process necessary to the
fully effective exercise of the President's Article H powers.
Instead of this convergence, we have had a weakening of
the institutional presidency along two fronts: not only is executive privilege reduced to a matter of judicial grace, but the judiciary has not been gracious in its construction of the privilege. This is not entirely surprising, given the circumstances
in which the courts have been called upon to rule on these
questions. When the Presidents claiming privilege are not
acting in good faith, the judiciary is not inclined to rule in favor
of generous constructions of their prerogatives or immunity.
III. NIXON AND THE DEATH OF PRESIDENTIAL
EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY
The third great error of United States v. Nixon was its
holding, almost sub silentio, that the President is not supreme
even within the executive branch. That is the astonishing, but
necessary, implication of the Court's holding that a nominally
subordinate executive branch officer may issue a subpoena to
the President; 146 that the President is powerless to order the
subordinate officer to withdraw the subpoena (short of firing
146. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 688 (1974).
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the subordinate);' 47 and that the courts may side with the subordinate, against the President, and direct the President to
148
comply with the subpoena.
That the Constitution provides for a unitary executive has
been set forth and elaborately defended in several convincing
articles, most recently and impressively in an exhaustive study
by Professors Calabresi and Prakash, two contributors to this
symposium, in an article published in the Yale Law Journal.149
I have little to add to their arguments other than the observation that the death of the unitary executive in the Supreme
Court's caselaw began with Nixon, not Morrison v. Olson. Morrison may have buried the unitary executive, but it had been
mortally wounded in Nixon. And it was the mugging of the
unitary executive in Nixon that paved the way for our brave
new world of Independent Counsels litigating against the
Presidents in whose executive branch they (nominally) serve,
invoking the executive authority of the United States against
the chief executive of the United States, making impeachment
referrals to the Congress (on behalf of the executive branch?!),
and perhaps even indicting the Presidents to whom they are
subordinate.
The reality of Nixon's blow to presidential supremacy
within the executive branch was seen first by Professor William Van Alstyne, whose prophetic commentary on the Nixon
Tapes Case in 1974 ranks among the most insightful law review articles I have read. 150 His perspective on Nixon's disastrous implications for the structural integrity of the Article II
executive-at the time, expressed as fears, not as inevitable
consequences-has essentially become my own. My short
summary here owes a tremendous intellectual debt to Professor Van Alstyne's treatment of Nixon, and the subsequent unitary executive scholarship of Professors Calabresi and Prakash.
The short of it is that Nixon rejected the President's argument that the dispute between Nixon and the Special Prosecutor was a purely intra-executive dispute in which the Court
could not legitimately play any role. Article I of the Constitution provides that the executive power-all of it-is "vested in
147. See id. at 696.
148. See id. at 714.
149. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
150. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14.
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a President of the United States."15 1 In Nixon, the President
had delegated some executive authority to a subordinate executive branch officer, the Watergate Special Prosecutor, and
agreed by regulation to restrictions on the traditional right of
the President to remove subordinate executive officers. The
Supreme Court held that President Nixon could remove the
Special Prosecutor only by rescinding or modifying the regulation by which the President had invested the Special Prosecu152
tor with power in the first place.
It is not high praise to say it, but this is the least unconvincing part of the Nixon opinion. There is a certain logic to
the formalism that the only way to rescind the Special Prosecutor's authority is to rescind it directly, by employing the reverse of the process by which it was granted. Nothing in the
Supreme Court's opinion says that President Nixon could not
make his will prevail within the executive branch, merely by
firing the Special Prosecutor. By giving President Nixon this
escape hatch, the Court's opinion on this point may, just
barely, be defensible-or at least not as strongly objectionable
53
as its other features.
But even granting this concession, the fact that the President may not remove the Special Prosecutor except by rescinding the regulation granting him his powers should not
mean that the President cannot countermand one of the Special Prosecutor's actions. Article II requires that the President
at all times have the superordinate authority to direct and control the exercise of any portion of the executive power. Nixon
holds, under the misleading label of justiciability, that the
President was without power to do so in this case. But the
question should not have been whether the dispute between
the Special Prosecutor and President Nixon was genuinely adversarial (unquestionably it was, as a practical matter) and of
the type that generally may be resolved by a court (unquestionably it was not, as a realistic matter). The real question
lurking under the veneer of a justiciability inquiry, goes to the
151. U.S.

CONST. art. 11, § 1.

152. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-97.
153. However, as Bill Kelley's fine article argues, the more one strains to
read Nixon in a way that does not do violence to Article II of the Constitution,
the harder it is to reconcile Nixon with Article M of the Constitution. See
Kelley, supra note 16. It is hard to see why the Nixon Tapes Case is properly
a matter for resolution by the courts if it involves an intra-executive dispute
as to what the executive branch's policy should be with respect to the desire to
use particular evidence in a trial.
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heart of the issue of Presidential control over the executive
power: who exercises ultimate authority as to a dispute over
the exercise of executive power-the President or a subordinate
executive officer?
On that question, Article H supplies a clear answer: the
President is the chief law enforcement officer of the nation; he
gets to make the call-for better or for worse. The Court had
no business reaching the executive privilege issue and ought
not to have had occasion to reach out with its judicial supremacist rhetoric, either. For in the Nixon Tapes Case, the subpoena issued only in response to an executive branch officer's
request for it and the Chief Executive had made clear to the
courts his disapproval-and consequent overruling-of that request. The Court should have respected the command of the
superior, not the subordinate. The executive authority of the
United States government-the President-had directed that
the subpoena not be enforced. The Supreme Court was wrong
to hold, at the instance of a subordinate executive officer, that
the subpoena was to be enforced.
Consider an analogy: what if the President were confronted with an order from an inferior federal court (say, for
example, District Judge Sirica in the Tapes Case itself), but the
Supreme Court had issued an order directing that the inferior
court's order was invalid and should not be enforced. Which
one constitutes the decision of the Article III branch of government? The decisions of the Supreme Court are of superior
status, as judicial interpretations of the law, to those of lower
federal courts, even though the Supreme Court has no authority to remove the judges of inferior courts. Whether the Supreme Court promulgates a regulation or not, the tenure of
lower court judges is protected against interference from the
authorities who may reverse their decisions.15 4
So too, the fact that the President may not remove (or simply has not removed) a subordinate officer does not and should
154. Consistent with my position above, I believe the President may constitutionally conclude that a district court's position is correct and the Supreme
Court's position is incorrect, for purposes of evaluating what the executive's
independent constitutional position will be. But it would be a gross error to
think that the district court's decision is the authoritative statement of the
position of the judiciary. Make no mistake: if the President were to follow the
decision of a lower court rather than that of the Supreme Court in direct opposition to it, he would not be abiding by the decision of the judiciary. He
would be exercising his independent constitutional prerogative in opposition
to the expressed will of a coordinate branch.
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not imply that he is without power to countermand that subordinate's actions. To be sure, in the usual case the more direct
route for the President would be to order his subordinate to
withdraw the request for the subpoena. Nixon was limited in
his ability to do so, the Court held, because the regulation
delegating authority to the Special Prosecutor had the effect of
preventing the President from countermanding the Special
Prosecutor's decisions unless he was prepared to take the
larger step of firing him. But even accepting that proposition,
it simply does not follow that the courts should find that the
Special Prosecutor, rather than the President, holds the supreme executive power on matters within his jurisdiction. It
only means that the President could not fire the Special Prosecutor without going through the formal process of promulgating a new executive branch regulation.
Morrison v. Olson took the further step of upholding the
constitutionality of the Independent Counsel provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act, which include legal restrictions on
the ability of the President to discharge an Independent Counsel.1 55 The President, acting through the Attorney General, can
discharge an Independent Counsel only "for good cause," and
the discharge can be challenged by the Independent Counsel
and set aside by the courts. 56 Even if the discharge is upheld,
that does not end the authority of the Independent Counsel's
office; a successor is simply appointed. Thus, the President
cannot be sure that he can effectively countermand an Independent Counsel's actions on behalf of the executive power of
the United States even by firing him. The President's sole
means of directing and controlling this exercise of executive
power is through the blunt weapon of the pardon. Nixon plus
Morrison equals lack of presidential supremacy over the actions of subordinate executive branch officers except by removing them and lack of effective power to remove them-a
double whammy to the logic of Article H.
A curious byproduct of Ken Starr's investigation of President Clinton's misconduct has been virtual unanimity that the
Independent Counsel arrangement is, if not flatly unconstitutional, deeply problematic and should be scrapped. This is the
right prescription but the diagnosis is a bit off. The Independent Counsel arrangement is unconstitutional; Justice Scalia's
155. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1994); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
156. See id. § 596(a)(3).
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dissent in Morrison was right on the money. 157 But the problem is not with Judge Starr's investigation, which was faithful
to the task set before him. One can disagree with Starr's
judgment as to the merit of investigating these particular
crimes; but one should not think the investigation improper on
the ground that a President should be immune from investigation if he is really determined to cover up his misdeeds.
If anything, Starr's investigation of Clinton seems to highlight the need for genuine independence in an independent
counsel. If ever there were an example of why it might be important that investigations of possible unlawful conduct by the
President and high administration officials be done by individuals not controlled by the President, Clinton's case is that
example. There can be little doubt that a President who would
commit perjury and obstruction of justice, and who would attempt to cover up such misdeeds with vigorous legal resistance
to discovery of evidence and testimony that could reveal them,
would effectively prevent a subordinate executive branch officer, lacking true independence, from pursuing an investigation
into such alleged wrongdoing. Few people would have had the
fortitude to press on, in the face of such determined resistance,
personal attacks, and public opposition. In a very real sense,
Ken Starr's continued pursuit of the truth has been little short
of heroic.
But if Ken Starr is an American hero, he is nonetheless an
unconstitutionalAmerican hero. The text, structure, and history of the Constitution simply do not permit the existence of a
nominally subordinate executive branch officer whose actions
may not be effectively countermanded by the President of the
United States. Does this view place the President above the
law? Not at all. It places him above all subordinate executive
branch officers, which is where he belongs. It is the role of
Congress to hold the President accountable to the law, through
the power of impeachment. Short of that, Congress may insist
that the President appoint a genuinely independent prosecutor, fully accountable to and removable by the President, but
subject the President to immense political reprisal if he should
dismiss the prosecutor for reasons that Congress distrusts.
The trick is to assure both practical independence and constitutional accountability. One possible statutory solution is to
provide for the appointment, upon a finding of grounds for fur157. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ther investigation of executive branch officials, of a "special
litigation committee," akin to the arrangement sometimes used
in derivative suits against corporate officers. The President
would nominate and, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint a panel of three independent "outside directors" to
represent the executive branch's investigative and prosecutorial interests in the matter. The goal would be to select individuals of sufficient stature that their objectivity could not reasonably be questioned. Imagine, for example, a blue ribbon
panel of former President Ford, former President Carter, and
retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, appointed to oversee the criminal investigation of President Clinton. (President
Reagan's appointment of the "Tower Board"-former Senator
John Tower, former Senator and former Secretary of State
Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft-for an intra-executive investigation of Iran-Contra
is roughly analogous.) The panel, consisting of constitutionally
appointed principal officers of the United States, could then
appoint a genuinely subordinate "special prosecutor" or "independent counsel" to manage the day-to-day details of the investigation but whose judgments would remain subject to the direction and oversight of the panel of outside directors-the
Special Litigation Committee.
The President would retain the power to countermand the
decisions of the Committee, as he constitutionally must, and
even to remove its members. But the object would be to make
it politically costly for the President to do so for any illegitimate reason-such as a desire to be rid of an investigation that
was getting too close to the truth. The prestige of the Committee's members would serve as a check against any future Saturday Night Massacre. Indeed, such prestige could serve to restrain the President from interference with the Committee's
work: resignation en masse of former Presidents Ford and Carter and former Justice White would send a powerful message.
Such a panel also could serve as a superior panel of arbitrators
of disputes concerning executive privilege-executive officers
balancing legitimate presidential interests in confidentiality
against legitimate interests in law enforcement.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all as a practical
matter, such a Special Litigation Committee could serve as a
"buffer" to protect a special prosecutor from political attack, as
well as to check the special prosecutor's decisions. The biggest
problem with Ken Starr's investigation has been its relative
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inability to defend itself politically against Clinton administration and press charges of overreaching, of misconduct, of poor
judgment, and of political bias. Yet almost all of Starr's contested judgments have been routinely upheld by the courts. I
can think of few of these charges that could have had any political staying power if they had been reviewed and approved
by a Ford-Carter-White committee, or a similarly prestigious
panel.
Would such an arrangement simply be a different device
for weakening the constitutional position of the Presidency?
No: unlike the Independent Counsel arrangement we have today, it would preserve the President's constitutional authority
over the actions of subordinate executive branch officers; unlike the arrangement we have today, it would provide a
mechanism for intra-executive resolution of executive privilege
disputes and, thus, a justification for a President's refusal to
submit such disputes to the judiciary (which, under the regime
of Nixon, has made the President subordinate to the judiciary
on questions of the scope of his constitutional prerogatives);
and it would indirectly strengthen the Presidency by providing
a better check against presidential lawlessness than a more
politically vulnerable Independent Counsel can provide.
IV. CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL ADVICE FOR THE
NEXT HONEST PRESIDENT
Bad Presidents make bad law. Nixon is the product not
only of its circumstances but of the President who provoked the
situation. The Court's result was inevitable given Nixon's evident criminality; doctrinal tidiness gave way to the need for
unanimity and a correct outcome. The result was, as a matter
of judicial doctrine at least, a weakened presidency: presidential subordinacy to judicial commands concerning the scope of
presidential powers and prerogatives; a weak, ill-defined
sphere of presidential and executive branch privilege; a precedent for the further carving-up of the Article II executive
power, at least in the area of criminal law enforcement; and a
stripping from the President of some measure of his constitutional control over the execution of the laws of the United
States.
So too, the judicial extensions of Nixon in the Clinton era
are the inevitable product of circumstance and presidential
character. Given Clinton's duplicity and abuse of claims of executive privilege and immunity, such claims have again been
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judicially rejected and politically discredited. The result,
again, is a weakening (at least as a matter of judicial doctrine
and public perception) of the Presidency: the President is subject to civil suit while in office for his personal conduct, without
meaningful constitutional limitation. The President is subject
to contempt citations for violations of discovery orders or for
giving false and misleading answers to interrogatories and
deposition questions, so long as those sanctions do not interfere
with his ability to perform the duties of his Office. The President personally may be compelled to appear before a federal
grand jury conducting a criminal investigation of his conduct,
without apparent constitutional limitation. The President's
Secret Service detail can be compelled to testify before a grand
jury as to the President's conduct. Indeed, given the courts'
holdings, it appears possible that a sitting President can be indicted, and perhaps even compelled to stand trial on criminal
charges (but not actually incarcerated).
Have Nixon and its progeny, including its Clinton-era extensions, irretrievably weakened the constitutional position of
the presidency? Not necessarily. A strong President (or succession of Presidents) might well be able to reassert and restore the constitutional prerogatives of the Office. The problem
is that these types of issues-executive privilege, independent
counsel investigations, civil and criminal litigation involving
the President-tend to arise in administrations and in circumstances where the President cannot credibly claim that he is
fighting to preserve the constitutional rights of the place,
rather than the individual interest of the man. Richard Nixon
was a crook. His invocation of executive privilege in the Tapes
Case was at least in part designed to cover up his crimes. His
firing of one Special Prosecutor, and his agreement to severe
removal restrictions on another, was not a stand on high constitutional principle about the need for a unitary executive. It
was a desire to derail a prosecutor who was getting too close to
the truth. So too with President Clinton. His invocations of
executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and secret service
privilege were not genuinely for the purpose of protecting the
Presidency as a constitutional office. They were designed to
cover up his misdeeds.
But it need not always be so. The next (honest) President
should, and in light of public weariness of both the pervasive
presidential dishonesty and the Independent Counsel investigations of the Clinton years probably could as a political mat-
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ter, announce (in advance) the following constitutional principles for his or her administration:
Notwithstanding Morrison v. Olson, the Independent Counsel Statute is unconstitutional in providing for a federal prosecutor not subject to the effective direction, control, and removal power of the
President. The Supreme Court's judgment as to the constitutionality
of this arrangement is not constitutionally binding on the executive
branch, as each branch must make an independent judgment on
questions of constitutionality arising within its sphere. [Here, the
President may cite President Andrew Jackson's veto of the Bank Bill
on constitutional grounds, and President Thomas Jefferson's pardons
of persons convicted under the Alien and Sedition acts.] If the need
for an investigation of administration officials arises and the Attorney General has a conflict of interest, I will appoint a special counsel
or a special committee to appoint and supervise a special counsel.
But that special counsel or special committee must always remain
under the control of the executive branch of the government. The actions and policy of the executive branch of the United States, including assessment of the interests of the executive branch of the United
States in connection with any criminal investigation or prosecution,
must always be subject to the direction and control of the President
of the United States. If the President of the United States cannot be
trusted in such matters, thatperson should not be the Presidentof the
United States.
Notwithstanding Clinton v. Jones, the President of the United
States must decide for himself whether it is appropriate to appear
and defend a civil lawsuit brought against him during the time that
he is in office. The courts may take what action they deem appropriate in this regard, in the exercise of their constitutional responsibilities, including entering default judgments, and the executive branch
will never seek to interfere with the proper functioning of the judicial
system. But the ultimate decision as to whether a judicial decree,
summons, subpoena, or order interferes with the ability of the President of the United States to perform his constitutional duties cannot
rest solely and exclusively with the judiciary. The courts may make
their orders, but it is for the executive to determine whether and how
they will be enforced. If the President of the United States cannot be
trusted in such matters, that person should not be the Presidentof the
United States.
Notwithstanding United States v. Nixon and other cases interpreting executive privilege, the President of the United States must
have the ability to maintain the confidentiality of deliberations
within the executive branch concerning matters legitimately within
the province of the executive branch. The President cannot be bound
by the judgment of the judiciary in this regard, and ultimately must
decide for himself whether it is appropriate to invoke executive
privilege to shield the confidentiality of such communications from
the other branches of government, or from civil litigants. Again, the
courts are free to exercise their responsibilities within their spheres,
but the ultimate decision concerning the propriety of any invocation
of executive privilege cannot rest solely and exclusively with the judi-
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ciary. If the Presidentof the United States cannot be trusted in such
matters, thatperson should not be the Presidentof the United States.

I do not think these statements of principle are unrealistic.
A strong, trustworthy President (or succession of Presidents)
could make such statements and stick with them, and the public would, I suspect, accept them as correct. Ours is not a perfect constitution, but it is the only one we have. The prospectthe reality, now twice in twenty-five years-that the President
of the United States may prove to be corrupt and criminal, does
not warrant a warping of the Constitution. Rather, it is a testament to the, necessity of choosing wisely the person who
holds this most important of constitutional offices, and of attending closely to issues of character and commitment to constitutional principle in making that choice.
It is also a testament to the importance of taking seriously
the very real checks on presidential abuse of power set forth in
the imperfect Constitution we have, rather than to jerry-rig
new ones that distort the Constitution. The Constitution's
critically important check against a President who abuses the
prerogatives of the office for personal purposes (whether corrupt, venal, or base), who interposes the immunities of the office for corrupt purposes (as, for example, by asserting unmeritorious claims of official privilege in order to cover up wrongful
conduct), who violates his oath to uphold the laws of the United
States, who engages in conduct deemed disgraceful to the office, who commits crimes that would warrant imprisonment, or
who engages in other serious misconduct of a criminal or noncriminal nature while in office, is impeachment.
The impeachment process is the constitutionallyprescribed political remedy for such "high crimes and misdemeanors" (a constitutional term of art denoting misconduct of
this sort by high political officials, whether or not also a violation of federal or state criminal law). There is reason to fear,
however, that the Independent Counsel statute's arrangement-by vesting investigative power in and requiring a report
to Congress of possible impeachable offenses by a public prosecutor whose responsibilities otherwise are directed at criminal
offenses-may have the ironic, unintended dual effect of both
sapping the energy out of Congress's exercise of the impeachment power (by allowing and almost requiring Congress to defer to an ongoing criminal investigation that might not be tak-
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ing place in the absence of an Independent Counsel statute) 158
and unduly narrowing the focus of the impeachment power to
criminal law violations (which is necessarily the primary focus
of a prosecutor's inquiry).
This is yet another legacy of Nixon. The ironic effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in the legal realm was that it cut
short impeachment proceedings in Congress by forcing Nixon
to reveal evidence that quickly proved his undoing and that led
to his resignation within a matter of just a few weeks. When
the Independent Counsel statute was enacted in the wake of
Watergate, the Independent Counsel quickly became Congress's de facto designated impeachment investigator, permitting such investigations to be launched more easily and with
less political cost, but also with some damage to Congress's
ability and willingness to exercise the hard, independent constitutional responsibility associated with the impeachment
power. At the same time that Nixon impaired the Constitution's structural separation of powers by enshrining the principle ofjudicial supremacy over the executive, it led to a perhaps
equally destructive diminution of the role of Congress as the
body primarily responsible for checking a runaway President.
As the events of 1999 have unfolded, twenty-five years after the Nixon Tapes Case, we have seen answered, unclearly
and uncomfortably, the question of whether the impeachment
power will be reinvigorated by the first serious situation calling for its application since President Nixon, or whether it will
continue gradually to recede into irrelevance-an anachronistic scarecrow that Congress lacks the will to make a serious
158. The problems that result if Congress proceeds forward with its own
investigation of matters that are also the subject of an ongoing criminal investigation by an Independent Counsel are well illustrated by the "Iran-Contra"
prosecution of Oliver North. See United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990); United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In order to
obtain information concerning the events in question, Congress was required
to grant Colonel North use immunity for his compelled statements under oath
before Congress. See North, 910 F.2d at 851. This in turn created enormous
difficulties (insuperable difficulties, as it turned out) for the Independent
Counsel in showing that no evidence, testimony or information subsequently
used against North in his criminal trial was "tainted" fruits from his immunized-compelled congressional testimony-testimony receiving enormous national attention for nearly an entire week. The practical realities of competing congressional and Independent Counsel investigations of potential
criminal matters, as illustrated by the North case, probably influenced Congress's decision in the Clinton peijury/obstruction of justice matter(s) to stay
its hand and not conduct an investigation that might inadvertently interfere
with the Independent Counsel's ability to conduct his criminal investigation.

1402

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1337

part of the Constitution's plan of checks and balances. The impeachment and acquittal of President Clinton is likely to evoke
hot debate for decades-as heated as the debate that still rages
over President Nixon. Time will tell, ultimately, but it seems
hard to avoid the conclusion that the consequence of the
Clinton impeachment and acquittal will be both a general
weakening of the impeachment power and a ratcheting down of
the standards of conduct expected of men and women holding
the office of President of the United States. The acquittal of
President Clinton, largely along party lines, leaves in officeand still under criminal investigation-a President who very
likely has committed serious federal felonies. It is almost unimaginable that President Nixon would have been permitted to
remain in office under similar circumstances. Yet, if history
had reversed the order of the two cases, it seems likely that
Nixon would have made a determined stand against removal
by the Senate, based on the Clinton precedent. Nixon might
well have survived in such a scenario, especially if he could
have used the military situations more skillfully to boost his
public approval ratings; or even if he simply possessed greater
charm and political skills. In any event, the Clinton precedent
doubtless increases the likelihood that a future President who
has committed crimes in office, or otherwise abused the public
trust, will fight impeachment, using the Clinton acquittal as
something of a constitutional benchmark: the President's offenses are arguably no worse than President Clinton's; obstruction of a legal investigation should not be impeachable (he
might argue) if a plausible argument exists that the investigation ought not to have been conducted in the first place; in any
event the President ought not to be removed if the nation could
survive his continuance in office for the remainder of his term;
and a President should not be impeached if he retains the support of his own political party.
None of this is good for the Presidency. The impeachment
power is an essential one in a constitutional regime with a
strong President strongly asserting the full measure of presidential authority and autonomy. The Constitution the framers
gave us (as opposed to the Nixon-Morrison modified regime
under which we now operate) contemplates a strong executive
subject to the strong check of the impeachment power. The
Presidency may only be reinvigorated if Congress's power of
impeachment is likewise reinvigorated, and a strong, honest
President should not fear-and perhaps should even wel-
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come-such reinvigoration. Perhaps a President making the
statements of principled defense of executive power, set forth a
few pages ago, should add a further proviso along the lines of
the following:
If the President of the United States cannot be trusted in such
matters, that person should not be the President of the United
States. A President should not continue to serve if he has committed
serious crimes against the laws of the United States, if he has engaged in serious misconduct in office, or if he has betrayed the trust
of the people. Congress possesses the rightful power to impeach,
convict, and remove the President of the United States for such offenses. The Presidency is more important than any individual occupant of the office. I will defend the powers and prerogatives of the
Presidency with all the power at my disposal and I will do my best to
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States
and to advance the best interests of the nation. I will never put my
own personal interest above that of the nation. I expect to be held to
these standards. If I violate them, I should be impeached and removed. While disagreement is possible in any given situation as to
how these high standards apply to particular conduct, I will never defend againstimpeachmenton the ground that the standardsas I have
stated them are too high to be expected of a President of the United
States or that the violation of such standardsfalls short of the constitutionalstandardof "high crimes and misdemeanors" required to impeach and remove a President. A President who would defend
against impeachment on such a ground is not worthy of the Office.

It is possible to restore some of the damage done to the Presidency by the Clinton acquittal if a strong President or, better
yet, a series of strong Presidents, is willing thus to reject the
lowering of the standards for impeachment that appears to be
the crux of the Clinton precedent.
The alternative to a strong impeachment power is a weak
Presidency. Congress, of course, may simply prefer that alternative. Congress, and the courts, may choose to have the
Presidency hobbled by Independent Counsel investigations, judicial proceedings, and the chopping up of the executive power
generally. If the price to be paid for a weakened presidency is
a diminished impeachment power, Congress may consider that
price small. And to the extent the impeachment power is
weakened, the perceived checks against a bad President must
come from elsewhere, creating pressure to alter the Constitution's arrangements. (In this way also, bad Presidents make
bad law.)
Such a regime, however, exacts a large cost from the Constitution. The Nixon case illustrates this point distressingly
well. If we care about the Presidency and the Constitution, we
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need to pay better attention to the lessons and mistakes of
Nixon-now more than ever.

